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GAY LIBERATION IN THE ILLIBERAL STATE 
Stewart L. Chang † 
Abstract: A comparative analysis of incrementalist approaches to gay rights as 
they are deployed in the United States and Singapore demonstrates that seeking gay 
rights in a full democracy is actually no better than seeking them in an authoritarian 
regime.  Incrementalism ultimately promotes sexual normativity by dividing the gay 
community into “good gays,” who deserve equal protections, and “bad queers,” who are 
further marginalized.  Incrementalism in the United States began with decriminalization 
of sodomy and terminated with the recognition of gay marriage but did so by imagining 
gay sexuality within the context of committed relationships. The gay rights movement in 
Singapore is currently challenging the constitutionality of the country’s anti-sodomy 
statute, but has also encountered problems with bifurcating good gays from bad queers.  
Singaporean gay rights advocacy has adopted an approach that looks similar to 
incrementalism in the United States, but is actually adapted as a strategy of survival 
within the authoritarian structures of its illiberal democratic government.  Dissecting 
these similarities shows how gay rights in the United States has acquiesced to a similar, 
but more hidden, disciplinary regime of social control that venerates marriage as an 
imagined ideal and suppresses other forms of sexual expression.  The recent decision by 
the Singapore judiciary to reject the good gay and bad queer dichotomy and treat the two 
similarly, however, has forced gay rights advocacy to adapt and imagine a different and 
more unified strategy than in the United States. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Although the decisions in United States v. Windsor 1  and 
Hollingsworth v. Perry2 were generally regarded as victories for equal gay 
rights in the United States, some commentators have met the decisions with 
more guarded optimism.3  In both cases, the United States Supreme Court 
                                                      
† Assistant Professor of Law, Whittier Law School and Assistant Professor of English (by courtesy), 
Whittier College.  The author is grateful to Erez Aloni, Lynette J. Chua, Judith Daar, Sheldon Lyke, Julie 
Manasfi, Manoj Mate, Radha Pathak, Martin Pritikin, Dickson Su, and Seval Yildirim for their helpful 
comments, feedback, and conversation.  
1 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
2 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
3 See Daniel J. Crooks III, Toward “Liberty”: How the Marriage of Substantive Due Process and 
Equal Protection in Lawrence and Windsor Sets the Stage for the Inevitable Loving of Our Time, 8 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 223, 224–25 (2013) (“Reasonable minds disagree over what exact legal basis or 
bases Justice Kennedy employed to arrive at the result in Windsor, with some law professors declaring the 
Windsor opinion to be a clarification of ‘rational basis with bite’; others focused more on Justice Kennedy's 
employment of federalism principles; and still others convinced that, without explicitly saying as much, 
Justice Kennedy relied most heavily on substantive due process arguments.”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, 
“Not Without Political Power”: Gays and Lesbians, Equal Protection and the Suspect Class Doctrine, 65 
ALA. L. REV. 975, 977 (2014) (“Because the Court issued minimalist rulings in Hollingsworth and Windsor, 
2  WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  VOL. 24 NO. 1 
 
comes short of granting sexual orientation the protections of heightened 
scrutiny as a matter of equal protection, for which many hoped.4  However, 
some interpreters have read Windsor and Hollingsworth as reflecting a 
positive incremental shift in public attitudes towards gays in the United 
States.5  The question remains, though, whether such incremental shifts 
towards a final goal of equality, as represented in the marriage equality 
movement in the United States, is completely positive.  Rather, 
incrementalism could represent a culmination of the heteronormative 
consequences feared by some gay rights scholars following Lawrence v. 
Texas.6  In striking down the Texas statute on substantive due process 
grounds 7  rather than prohibiting government sanction of homosexual 
                                                                                                                                                                 
the doctrinal status of sexual orientation in equal protection case law remains unsettled and 
undertheorized.”); see also Susannah W. Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus, and the Future of Equality, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 204 (2013). 
4  See William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal 
Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367 (2014); see also 
Heather K. Gerken, Larry and Lawrence, 42 TULSA L. REV. 843, 849 (2007) (“I believe that equal 
protection is the right frame for most future questions [after Lawrence]—not the formal and cramped sort 
of equal protection analysis we see in Justice O'Connor's opinion, but a robust form of equal protection that 
recognizes the possibility of stigma even when people are nominally being treated the same.”); Hutchinson, 
supra note 3; Adam Lamparello, Why Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Windsor Shortchanged Same-Sex 
Couples, 46 CONN. L. REV. ONLINE 27 (2014), available at http://connecticutlawreview.org/files/2014/01/ 
Lamparello.JusticeKennedysOpinioninWindsor.Final_.pdf. 
5  See Anthony Niedwiecki, Save Our Children: Overcoming the Narrative that Gays and Lesbians 
are Harmful to Children, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 125 (2013); Maxwell L. Stearns, Grains of Sand 
or Butterfly Effect: Standing, the Legitimacy of Precedent, and Reflections on Hollingsworth and Windsor, 
65 ALA. L. REV. 349, 397 (2013); see also Crooks, supra note 3.  
6  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) 
MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 83-109 (2008); David B. Cruz, Spinning Lawrence, 
or Lawrence v. Texas and the Promotion of Heterosexuality, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 249 (2005); Katherine M. 
Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004); Nancy D. 
Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle 
the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993); Marc Spindelman, 
Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615 (2004); see also Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s 
Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1389 (2005) (“[W]hat to many people, including lesbians and gay men and a 
number of our heterosexual allies, looks like increasingly good news—the movement from Hardwick’s 
anti-gay moral disapproval of homosexuality to Lawrence’s reversal of it, along with its own assimilation 
of homosexuality to a heterosexualized marriage norm, to Goodridge's recent perfection of the 
assimilationism—is to others, chiefly those concerned with stopping sexuality's abuse, a decidedly mixed 
bag.”).  
7  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (“[L]iberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding 
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”); see also Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence 
Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1148 (2004) (“[T]he Lawrence Court took a law that focused on 
homosexuals alone and used it to strike down laws that banned both homosexual and heterosexual 
sodomy . . . . Instead of relying on a narrow equal protection rationale to strike down laws of the four states 
that targeted gay sex, the Court dramatically and unexpectedly revived substantive due process to strike 
down the laws of all thirteen states with sodomy laws.”).  But see Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: 
The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speaking Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1902–16 (2004) 
(suggesting that the Lawrence decision represents a blend of substantive due process and equal protection). 
JANUARY 2015  GAY LIBERATION IN THE ILLIBERAL STATE  3 
 
conduct or identity,8 the Lawrence Court situated gay sex underneath the 
larger constitutional umbrella of sexual privacy, which until then was 
characterized by consensual heterosexual sex.9  The Court did not guarantee 
the rights of gay persons to not be discriminated against; instead, it affirmed 
a broader right to intimacy for all people, but only in certain contexts.10  The 
Lawrence decision did not state there is nothing wrong with gay sex, but that 
gay sex is acceptable in the exact same contexts that heterosexual sex is 
acceptable.11  The Court simply marked the private sphere of consensual 
sexual relationships, whether heterosexual or gay, as inviolate. 12   In 
Lawrence, Justice Kennedy’s contextualization of sex within a “personal 
bond that is more enduring”13 pointed towards a privileging of marriage as 
the ideal framework for these protections.  Windsor continued the legacy of 
Lawrence in furthering the right of all individuals to enjoy intimacy in 
certain contexts, but further venerated and entrenched marriage as the 
definitive context for intimacy.14  Writing for the Windsor majority, Justice 
                                                      
8 See Sonia Katyal, Sexuality and Sovereignty: The Global Limits and Possibilities of Lawrence, 14 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1429, 1435 (2006) (“Yet Lawrence, by focusing on privacy and liberty, instead, 
has quietly and subtly reoriented this project along a different and more convergent continuum that 
emphasizes the need for protection through the lens of autonomy, privacy, and liberty, rather than the trope 
of expressive identity.”); Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v. 
Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1081, 1089 (2004) (“By choosing the doctrinal road it did, the Court effectively 
extended heterosexuality's right to sexual privacy and sexual autonomy to gay men and lesbian women. 
The question is not whether same-sex sexual expression should be subject to special prohibitions (it should 
not), but whether heterosexuality’s substantively sex-unequal rules should be extended rather than 
challenged and changed.”). 
9 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
10 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons 
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be 
refused.  It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government 
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does 
involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common 
to a homosexual lifestyle.  The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.”). 
11 Id. at 573–74 (“The Casey decision again confirmed that our laws and tradition afford 
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, child rearing, and education . . . . Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy 
for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”).  
12 Id. at 578 (“Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage 
in their conduct without intervention of the government. ‘It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a 
realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.’”) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 
505 U.S. at 874). 
13 Id. at 567; see Craig Willse & Dean Spade, Freedom in a Regulatory State?: Lawrence, Marriage 
and Biopolitics, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 309, 314 (2005) (“They do so by addressing homosexuality in terms 
of ‘coupled’ behavior, rather than specific acts of sodomy, thereby constructing a homosexual identity 
more parallel to incentivized heterosexual family norms.”). 
14 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) (“[S]ome States concluded that same-sex 
marriage ought to be given recognition and validity in the law for those same-sex couples who wish to 
define themselves by their commitment to each other . . . . Slowly at first and then in rapid course, the laws 
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Kennedy specifically connected marriage to the “more enduring” bond that 
he alluded to in Lawrence.15   
The progression from Lawrence to Windsor confirms the prediction of 
some prominent scholars that the incremental fight for gay rights in the 
United States begins with decriminalization of anti-sodomy and terminates 
with the recognition of gay marriage.16   Yet this road to the legitimization of 
gay rights also entrenches a hierarchized dichotomy of the “good gay” over 
the “bad queer,” where the assimilated good gay becomes the figure of 
acceptable gay identity in mainstream heterosexual society, and the bad 
queer is further marginalized.17  Windsor essentially affirms the sexually 
normative sentiment of Lawrence, which has now perhaps become difficult 
to counteract.  As the Ninth Circuit ruled in Perry v. Brown—the underlying 
case to Hollingsworth—the legitimization of gay marriage is a one-way 
ratchet, and once realized there is no turning back.18  Indeed, it is now 
virtually impossible to go back to Lawrence and reconsider the distinctions 
of treating anti-sodomy as a matter of “we are not being treated equally to 
heterosexuals” versus “we are not doing anything wrong.”   
                                                                                                                                                                 
of New York came to acknowledge the urgency of this issue for same-sex couples who wanted to affirm 
their commitment to one another before their children, their family, their friends, and their community.”). 
15 Id. at 2692 (“The States’ interest in defining and regulating the marital relation, subject to 
constitutional guarantees, stems from the understanding that marriage is more than a routine classification 
for purposes of certain statutory benefits.  Private, consensual sexual intimacy between two adult persons of 
the same sex may not be punished by the State, and it can form ‘but one element in a personal bond that is 
more enduring.’”) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)); see also id. at 2694 (“The 
differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects . . . and 
whose relationship the State has sought to dignify.”).  
16 Jeremiah A. Ho, Weather Permitting: Incrementalism, Animus, and the Art of Forecasting 
Marriage Equality After U.S. v. Windsor, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014) (“By consensus, [William] 
Eskridge, [Yuval] Merin, and [Kees] Waaldijk all prescribe those steps in the following sequence: (1) the 
decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy occurs first; (2) then anti-discrimination against sexual 
minorities is furthered; and (3) lastly, the relationships of same-sex couples are then legally recognized. 
Once a state has crossed these three steps, the conditions for marriage equality will then be most evident.”). 
17 See CARL STYCHIN, A NATION BY RIGHTS: NATIONAL CULTURES, SEXUAL IDENTITY POLITICS, 
AND THE DISCOURSE OF RIGHTS 200 (1998) (“[L]esbians and gays seeking rights may embrace the ideal of 
‘respectability,’ a construction that then perpetuates a division between ‘good gays’ and (disreputable) ‘bad 
queers.’”); Jade McGleughlin & Sue Hyde, Can a Diamond Ever Be Gay?, 9 STUD. GENDER & SEXUALITY 
184, 192 (2008) (“We do not want to be the good gays cast against the ever more marginalized group that 
chooses (or has no choice about) other ways to live and love.”). 
18 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) (“By using their initiative power to target a 
minority group and withdraw a right that it possessed, without a legitimate reason for doing so, the People 
of California violated the Equal Protection Clause.”); Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism 
and Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 788 (2013) (“The Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning was narrow, relying primarily on Romer to hold unconstitutional the revocation of marriage 
rights in a state that had once offered such rights and still offers domestic partnership.  Should the Supreme 
Court choose to avoid the momentous substantive question of whether the U.S. Constitution categorically 
forbids states from banning same-sex marriage, it could instead resolve Perry on standing grounds.”) 
(internal citations omitted).  
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Thus, it is useful to examine a country that is currently at this 
“Lawrence moment” in terms of its own anti-sodomy statute.  The Singapore 
Court of Appeals recently consolidated two cases challenging the 
constitutionality of its anti-sodomy statute, Section 377A of its Penal 
Code.19  The statute reads: 
 
Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or abets 
the commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the 
commission by any male person of, any act of gross indecency 
with another male person, shall be punished with imprisonment 
for a term which may extend to 2 years.20 
 
The two cases, one by a committed gay couple of over 15 years,21 and the 
other by a man arrested for having oral sex in a shopping mall restroom,22 
represent not only the nuances of the “we are not being treated equally” and 
the “we are not doing anything wrong” arguments, but also the two poles of 
the good gay and bad queer dichotomy.  The Singapore Court of Appeal’s 
decision to treat the two cases together, despite protestations from some gay 
activists to recognize them separately, illuminates and can potentially 
subvert the false dichotomy between good gays and bad queers.  
The divergent strategies for seeking gay rights in Singapore also 
illustrate the peculiarities of advocacy in Singapore’s hybridized form of 
government, which is described by some scholars as an “illiberal 
democracy” for its adherence to an authoritarian rule of law despite the 
structural veneer of free elections and an embrace of free market 
capitalism. 23   Some critics have denounced the illiberal democracy of 
Singapore as breeding a population disciplined to follow the rules, leading to 
an incomplete or stunted citizenry when compared to its counterparts in 
Western democracies.24  Arguably, seeking gay rights in a full democracy is 
                                                      
19 Selina Lum, Appeals of Two Section 377A Challenges Will Be Heard Together, STRAITS TIMES 
(Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.straitstimes.com/breaking-news/singapore/story/appeals-two-section-377a-
challenges-will-be-heard-together-20131010 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
20  Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) s 337(A). 
21 Lim Meng Suang and Kenneth Chee Mun-Leon v. Attorney General (Lim Meng Suang I) [2013] 
SGHC 73, at para. 2. 
22 Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney General (Tan Eng Hong II) [2013] SGHC 199, at para. 4. 
23 See DANIEL BELL, DAVID BROWN, KANISHKA JAYASURIYA, & DAVID MARTIN JONES, TOWARD 
ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN PACIFIC ASIA (1995); see also KEVIN HEWISON, RICHARD ROBISON, & GARRY 
RODAN, SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE 1990S: AUTHORITARIANISM, DEMOCRACY, AND CAPITALISM (1993). 
24 See CHRISTOPHER LINGLE, SINGAPORE’S AUTHORITARIAN CAPITALISM: ASIAN VALUES, FREE 
MARKET ILLUSIONS, AND POLITICAL DEPENDENCY (1996); Hussin Mutalib, Illiberal Democracy and the 
Future of Opposition in Singapore, 21 THIRD WORLD Q. 313, 325–26 (2000) (“The Republic’s traditional 
immigrant and clan mentality, which continues to influence the psyche of the majority Chinese populace 
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actually no better than seeking them in an authoritarian regime, and 
ultimately produces similar results.  By taking an approach that enables the 
good gay and bad queer dichotomy and promotes sexual normativity, gay 
rights in the United States has acquiesced to a similar disciplinary model of 
social control as Singapore.25  Although some scholars have suggested that 
Lawrence and Windsor are potentially libertarian decisions,26 the two cases 
are actually illiberal decisions.  Rather than liberate, they confine gay rights 
to a restrictive time, place, and manner, in much the same way that 
Singapore does, albeit in a more unapologetic fashion.  
Part I of this article discusses how gay rights advocacy in Singapore 
evolved to accommodate its hybridized form of government but ultimately 
adopted a modified strategy of incrementalism seen in Western democracies.  
Controversies within the gay community as a result of the two different 
constitutional challenges to Section 377A demonstrate the pitfalls of 
adopting Western incrementalism as a model, namely the propensity to fall 
into the good gay and bad queer dichotomy.  
Part II analyzes how the Singaporean High Court decisions upholding 
Section 377A further demonstrate the insufficiencies of incrementalist equal 
protection approaches.  It then looks at the ways in which pushing gay rights 
as a liberty interest issue reveals the normative structures at play not only in 
Singapore, but also in the West.  Part III discusses how the impetus in the 
West to treat gay rights as a matter of equal treatment of gays to 
heterosexuals rather than an overall liberty interest for all, merely produces 
another version of restrictive heteronormativity that is no different from the 
limitations on gay expression that currently exist in Singapore.  Because the 
Singaporean Court of Appeals has rejected this bifurcation and the 
distinction between good gays and bad queers, the Singaporean government 
is forcing gay rights advocacy to adapt and imagine a different and 
potentially more unified strategy than in the United States. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
(whose emphasis on financial and material pursuits is universally known), and the lack of a developed 
competitive political tradition given the Republic’s short period of nationhood, has created a generation of 
Singaporeans who do not know, let alone are capable of fathoming, some other style of governance than the 
PAP.”).  But see Simon S.C. Tay, Human Rights, Culture, and the Singapore Example, 41 MCGILL L. J. 
743, 745 (1996). 
25 See Dean Spade, Under the Cover of Gay Rights, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 79 (2013). 
26 See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, CATO SUP. 
CT. REV. 21 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, Grading Justice Kennedy: A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 89 MINN. 
L. REV. 1582 (2005); John R. Dorocak, Is the Constitution Only Libertarian and Not Socially 
Conservative? U.S. v. Windsor and the Unconstitutionality of DOMA’s Definition of Marriage to Exclude 
Same-Sex Couples—Requiem for a Heavyweight, 24 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 263 (2014). But see 
Carpenter, supra note 7. 
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II. SEX IN THE LION CITY 
A. Singapore as an Illiberal Democracy 
Singapore is a nation of interesting paradoxes that create an 
unexpected forum for exploring, critiquing, and possibly resolving divisions 
in the politics of gay advocacy.  Singapore is a hybridized form of 
democracy: it partially embraces Western democratic principles in order to 
promote accelerated economic expansion, yet imposes heavy restrictions on 
individual civil liberties in order to maintain social stability.27  Ruled as a 
British colony since 1826, Singapore gained independence first as a member 
of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 and then as a separate nation in 
1965.28  At the time it separated from Malaysia, Singapore was in a 
precarious economic condition.  Under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew and 
the People’s Action Party (PAP), the government rejected socialism and 
embraced capitalism in the midst of the Cold War to attract foreign 
investment, resulting in rapid economic growth. 29   Believing that this 
economic growth depended on social stability, the PAP government enacted 
authoritarian policies, which essentially consolidated control for the ruling 
party and justified them with the discourse of pragmatism and survival.30  
For example, Singapore placed significant restrictions on free speech,31 the 
press,32 and free association,33 rationalizing that criticism of the government 
                                                      
27 LYNETTE J. CHUA, MOBILIZING GAY SINGAPORE: RIGHTS AND RESISTANCE IN AN AUTHORITARIAN 
STATE 29 (2014) [hereinafter “MOBILIZING GAY SINGAPORE”] (“The PAP constantly reminds Singaporeans 
of their nation’s tumultuous conception and touts social harmony as essential to economic survival, framing 
the two together as paramount to the nation’s security.”). 
28 See Michael Haas, The Political History, in THE SINGAPORE PUZZLE 15–22 (Michael Haas ed., 2d 
ed. 2014). 
 29  Id. at 23 (“When it became clear that Singapore leaders had totally abandoned socialism, direct 
foreign investment poured into the country, and the country decreasingly depended on its role in entrepot 
trade.  What followed as spectacular economic growth, which enhanced the international reputation of its 
prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew.”). 
30 See BENG-HUAT CHUA, COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY IN SINGAPORE 19 (1995) 
[hereinafter “COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY”] (“Since the necessity of economic growth 
had been ideologically raised to the ‘only reality,’ any process that contributed to economic growth was 
therefore ‘practical,’ indeed ‘necessary’ for the survival of the nation.  ‘Pragmatism became the term used 
to gloss over economic instrumental rationality . . . . The state has over the years thoroughly penetrated and 
controlled society in the name of ensuring economic growth’”); Kenneth Paul Tan, New Politics for a 
Renaissance City?, in RENAISSANCE SINGAPORE?: ECONOMY, CULTURE, AND POLITICS 17 (Kenneth Paul 
Tan ed., 2007) (“Old politics in Singapore has mainly been about shaping the public imagination with 
national narratives of permanent vulnerability and fragile success.”). 
31 Sedition Act (Cap 290, 2013 Rev Ed) s 2–4; see also Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 
(1965), Art 14. 
32 Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (Cap 206, 2002 Rev Ed). 
33 Public Order Act (Cap 257A, 2009 Rev Ed) s 5. 
8  WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  VOL. 24 NO. 1 
 
upsets social stability.34  The government also enacted the Internal Security 
Act to suspend the liberty interests of individuals suspected of dissidence in 
the name of national security.35  Political theorists classify Singapore as an 
illiberal democracy, defined by three distinguishing characteristics: “first, a 
non-neutral understanding of the state; second, the evolution of a 
rationalistic and legalistic technocracy that manages the developing state as 
a corporate enterprise; finally, the development of a managed rather than a 
critical public space and civil society.”36  Western political scientists often 
criticize Singapore as incomplete in comparison to the Western democracies 
for its restrictions on individual civil liberties and management of its citizens 
in contrast to Western democracies.37  However, the citizenry by and large 
has accepted, or been disciplined into accepting, 38  this mode of 
government.39  In this respect, Singapore epitomizes the disciplinary power 
of state “governmentality.”40 Michel Foucault defines governmentality as the 
exercise of power over a population through “political economy as its major 
form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical 
instrument.” 41   Through these mechanisms of control, Singapore has 
                                                      
34 See generally Derek Davies, The Press, in THE SINGAPORE PUZZLE 91 (Michael Haas ed., 2d ed. 
2014). 
35 Internal Security Act (Cap 143, 1985 Rev Ed); see also COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 31. 
36 BELL et. al., supra note 23, at 163.  
37 See Clark D. Neher, The Case for Singapore, in THE SINGAPORE PUZZLE 46 (Michael Haas ed., 2d 
ed. 2014) (“[Singapore’s] political system, controlled as it is by the People’s Action Party (PAP), is more 
authoritarian than Americans would find acceptable, and its emphasis on law and order, rules, and 
conformity have given the island state an antiseptic quality very much at odds with the more open 
American culture.”); see also JOTHIE RAJAH, AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW: LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE 
AND LEGITIMACY IN SINGAPORE 8 (2012) (“[I]ndividual rights are at the heart of liberal conceptions of the 
‘rule of law’ . . . . the Singapore state neither adheres to the pre-liberal constraints on government, nor 
regards individual rights as inviolable.”). 
38 See Tan, supra note 30, at 17, 22 (“Through a thoroughly rationalized system of regimentation, 
training, bureaucratic administration, surveillance, material incentives, and affluence (classic features of 
Herbert Marcuse’s (1964) ‘one-dimensional’ advanced industrial society), members of this class have been, 
and continue to be, socialized as individuals who are affirmative, conservative, fearful of both change as 
well as difference, and materialistic and consumerist in orientation.  The system produces individuals who 
fit the authoritarian personality associated with vulgar accounts of Confucianism.”); see also Mutalib, 
supra note 24, at 326. 
39 COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 19 (“[T]he independent state is 
also an interventionist state that reduces the power of the civil society, reducing the government/people 
relationship to a bargain: extensive political and social administration for improved material life.”); see also 
Neher, supra note 37, at 58 (“In fact, many Singaporeans do not covet Western-style democracy, fearing 
that it could jeopardize their stability and threaten their affluent living standards.”). 
40 See generally RAJAH, supra note 37, at 55–64. 
41 MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION 108 (Michel Senellart et al. eds., 
Graham Burchell trans., 2007). 
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successfully disciplined a population characterized by self-policing and 
working within the rules in the interest of the nation.42 
B. The Illiberal Pragmatics of the Gay Rights Movement in Singapore 
The nuances of Singapore’s history as an illiberal democracy has 
shaped its local gay rights movement.43  Audrey Yue describes gay identity 
in Singapore as functioning within “illiberal pragmatism,” which is 
“characterized by the ambivalence between non-liberalism and 
neoliberalism, rationalism and irrationalism that governs the illegality of 
homosexuality in Singapore.”44  The stance that the Singapore government 
eventually adopted in respect to its growing gay population utilized the same 
rhetoric of pragmatism previously deployed in its justification of other 
authoritarian restrictions.45  Singapore retains Section 377A of the Penal 
Code, the colonial anti-sodomy statute it had inherited from the British,46 but 
selectively enforces it.  The government typically reserves enforcement only 
for cases involving force, coercion, or public indecency.47  However, so long 
as Section 377A continues to be in effect, it could be invoked at any time, 
and there have been periodic seasons of impromptu increased police 
                                                      
42 See Geraldine Heng & Janadas Devan, State Fatherhood: The Politics of Nationalism, Sexuality, 
and Race in Singapore, in NATIONALISMS AND SEXUALITIES 343 (Andrew Parker et al. eds., 1992) (“[B]y 
repeatedly focusing anxiety on the fragility of the new nation, its ostensible vulnerability to every kind of 
exigency, the state’s originating agency is periodically reinvoked and ratified, its access to wide-ranging 
instruments of power in the service of national protection continually consolidated. It is a post-Foucauldian 
truism that they who successfully define and superintend a crisis, furnishing its lexicon and discursive 
parameters, successfully confirm themselves the owners of power, the administration of crisis operating to 
revitalize ownership of the instruments of power even as it vindicates the necessity of their use.”). 
43 See COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 30; see also Lynette J. Chua, 
Pragmatic Resistance, Law, and Social Movements in Authoritarian States: The Case of Gay Collective 
Action in Singapore, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 713 (2012). 
44 Audrey Yue, Queer Singapore: A Critical Introduction, in QUEER SINGAPORE: ILLIBERAL 
CITIZENSHIP AND MEDIATED CULTURES 2 (Audrey Yue & Jun Zubillaga-Pow eds., 2012). 
45 Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at paras. 84, 86 (“[D]uring the October 2007 Parliamentary Debates 
and submitted that in view of the reasons put forward for the retention of [Section] 377A, the purpose of 
the provision was now this: since neither the pro-[Section] 377A side nor the anti-[Section] 377A side 
would be able to convince the other of its point of view, and since pushing the issue would polarise and 
divide our society, we should live and let live, and it was best that we do nothing and leave [Section] 377A 
as it stood . . . . it was a practical reason why, amongst other more basic reasons, [Section] 377A should be 
retained.”). 
46 See ANDREW PHANG & CHAN WING CHEONG, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE (2001). 
47 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 October 2007) vol 83 at col 2175 (“Police 
have not been proactively enforcing the provision and will continue to take this stance.  But this does not 
mean that the section is purely symbolic and thus redundant.  There have been convictions over the years 
involving cases where minors were exploited and abused or where male adults committed the offence in a 
public place such as a public toilet or back-lane.”); id. (“Moreover, it has not been invoked in respect of 
consensual sex since 1993.  So this law is rarely applied or, if applied, it applies to minors or acts in 
public.”). 
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involvement against the gay community. 48   The gay community also 
struggles with ambivalence and uncertainty with other illiberal regulations, 
such as limitations on expression of gay identity. 49   Unsystematic 
enforcement of Section 377A over the years has partially contributed to a 
culture of vigilance and self-policing within the gay community.50  Section 
377A, therefore, demonstrates the disciplinary power of the state over the 
gay community in Singapore,51 and illustrates Foucault’s principle of the 
panopticon.52  The fight for civil liberties is often regarded as criticism of the 
government and potentially a sign of punishable disloyalty.53  Thus, the gay 
community has progressed cautiously for fear that Section 377A or other 
laws could be deployed at any time as a means of quashing activism.54  As a 
result of the authoritarian regime’s conditioning, the gay movement in 
Singapore has deemed itself fragile and needs to work within the illiberal 
system as a strategy for survival.55  This approach ironically mirrors the 
same pragmatism that justifies the illiberalism of the state.56  
                                                      
48 See COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 53 (“Despite the first 
openings for the [gay] movement, followed by its first escalation, expansion, and diversification, the early 
1990s proved to be a hostile time to be gay in Singapore.  The police frequently raided gay businesses and 
entrapped gay men at popular cruising grounds.”). 
49 See Mariko Oi, Is Singapore’s Stance on Homosexuality Changing?, BBC (Apr. 22, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22088852 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (“But not only is sex between 
men illegal, there are also censorship guidelines in Singapore which ban media outlets from promoting 
homosexual acts.  ‘Exactly what is prohibited is grey but the familiar line is that you are not supposed to 
portray homosexuality in a positive or normal way,’ says [Professor Lynette J.] Chua from the National 
University of Singapore.  ‘So is an interview of a celebrity who is in a same-sex relationship considered the 
promotion of homosexuality?  Apparently yes, because the broadcaster has been fined before.’”). 
50 See Simon Obendorf, Both Contagion and Cure: Queer Politics in the Global City-State, in 
QUEER SINGAPORE: ILLIBERAL CITIZENSHIP AND MEDIATED CULTURES 97, 97 (Audrey Yue & Jun 
Zubillaga-Pow eds., 2012) (describing the dilemma for gay activists in Singapore “of attempting to 
extrapolate from official pronouncements the range of queer identities, spaces and behaviours that will be 
tolerated by Singaporean state managers.”). 
51 See id. (“[T]he regulatory and policing powers of the Singaporean government give it a unique 
capacity to coerce, surveil and intervene in varied aspects of queer life.”); see also Ryan Goodman, Beyond 
the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643, 688–
89 (2001) (describing the role of anti-sodomy statutes in producing an atmosphere where “many lesbian 
and gay individuals regularly feel themselves under the eye of power.”). 
52 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 201 (Alan Sheridan trans., 
1979) (describing how the panopticon, a central watchtower in a prison, is deployed to produce self-
policing subjects by “creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; 
in short, that inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the 
bearers . . . the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at any one moment; but he must be sure 
that he may always be so.”). 
53 See Jothie Rajah & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Of Absences, Masks, and Exceptions: Cause 
Lawyering in Singapore, 31 WIS. INT’L L.J. 646 (2013). 
54 See COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 45 (“Faced with external 
threats from the state and media, [Singaporean gay activists] adjusted tactics to fight for the movement’s 
survival.”). 
55 Id. at 146 (“Deploying pragmatic resistance to advance their movement without jeopardizing its 
survival, gay activists interact with formal law, political norms and shifts in these forces to push the 
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Lynette Chua describes this strategy for the gay movement in 
Singapore as “pragmatic resistance.”  She views pragmatic resistance as an 
alternative strategy  
 
to represent homosexuality positively through whatever cracks 
they can find or pry open formal law and advocating for 
decriminalization and acceptance of homosexuality [in order to] 
further defy the symbolism of Section 377A and regulations 
that inherently treat homosexuality as wrong or deviant.57   
 
Although Chua defines this strategy of “pragmatic resistance” in contrast to 
earlier Western models of gay liberation,58 the Singaporean approach to gay 
rights actually more closely resembles later strategies of incrementalism that 
eventually became successful in the United States and Europe.59  Under the 
incremental approach, decriminalization of sodomy is the first step. 60 
Through the 1990s and 2000s, the gay community in Singapore engaged in 
progressive, yet cautious mobilization that eventually led to the “Repeal 
377A” movement in 2007, when the issue of possibly removing Section 
377A came before Parliament during its reform of the Penal Code.61  The 
repeal movement, however, spurred a backlash from a small yet vocal 
religious minority62 that cited the traditional Asian values of the ethnically 
Chinese majority population as needing protection against neocolonial 
pressures from the morally over-permissive West. 63   The Singaporean 
                                                                                                                                                                 
boundaries of political norms at the same time that they toe the line.”).  See also Chua, supra note 43, at 
719 (“To ensure survival, activists often avoid antagonizing the authoritarian state.”). 
56 COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 19 (“[T]he idea of a ‘crisis of 
survival’ is periodically constructed in order to revive the legitimacy for repressive interventions.”). 
57 MOBILIZING GAY SINGAPORE, supra note 27, at 154. 
58 Id. at 146 (“Whereas the strategy and tactics of Stonewall and gay liberation drew from a decade 
of civil rights protests, black militancy, campus demonstrations, and the rise of the New Left in the United 
States, the pragmatic resistance of Singapore’s gay movement was born of strategic adaption to almost fifty 
years of single-party, authoritarian rule in the postcolonial state.”).   
59 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF 
GAY RIGHTS (2002); see also Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got 
Paved in the Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, 
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 437–68 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andens eds., 2001); Ho, supra 
note 16, at 6–9. 
60 See Ho, supra note 16, at 7 (“[T]he decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy occurs 
first.”). 
61 See Chua, supra note 43, at 735 (2012); see generally COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 30. 
62 See Jianlin Chen, Singapore’s Culture War Over Section 377A: Through the Lens of Public 
Choice and Multilingual Research 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 106 (2013); see also Chua, supra note 43, at 
736. 
63 See Stewart Chang, The Postcolonial Problem for Global Gay Rights, 32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 309, 
344–45 (2014). 
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government reacted with its typical stance of illiberal pragmatism for the 
sake of social stability.  This resulted in a limited compromise where the 
Prime Minister stipulated to allowing Section 377A to officially remain the 
law while indicating that the Singaporean government would not be 
proactive in enforcement against private gay conduct.64  On the one hand, 
the Singaporean government was being sensitive to the role of gay rights in 
promoting a tolerant atmosphere to attract Western business and 
investment.65  On the other hand, the Singaporean government did not want 
to disturb the social stability of the status quo,66 which led to the pragmatic 
decision to retain Section 377A.  In the interest of stability and continued 
economic growth, the government tried to allay both sides.67   
Following the 2007 decision by Parliament to retain Section 377A, the 
gay community began to strategize on how to formally challenge the law.68  
The process evolved into a two-prong approach that eventually coincided 
and further resembled Western incrementalist strategies.  Gay rights 
advocates started thinking about a formal legal challenge in the courts of 
law.69  Yet, realizing that the vast majority of Singaporeans did not support 
homosexuality,70 the gay community began a public relations campaign to 
                                                      
64 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 October 2007) vol 83 at col 2469–72. 
65 Holning Lau, Human Rights and Globalization: Putting the Race to the Top in Perspective, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. 319, 320 (2008) (“In April 2007, for example, Lee Kuan Yew—Singapore’s founding 
father, who remains a highly influential cabinet member—recommended gradually reforming the city-
state’s criminalization of same-sex sexual relationships.  Lee’s reasoning was more economic than 
normative.  He did not focus on the liberty, equality, or dignity of Singapore’s sexual orientation minorities.  
Rather, he focused on the fact that reforming Singapore’s staid image is necessary to attract foreign 
investment and educated immigrants who can further develop Singapore as a hub for science, technology, 
and financial services.”). 
66 See e.g., Tessa Wong, Singapore Dilemma: When Diversity Policy Meets Local Law, BBC (June 
14, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27584565 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (“News of [an 
event at Goldman Sachs to recruit LGBT employees] caused enough handwringing that Minister for Social 
and Family Development Chan Chun Sing publicly expressed concern.  While discrimination had ‘no place 
in our society’, foreign companies should ‘respect local culture and context’ and ‘not venture into public 
advocacy for causes that sow discord among Singaporeans,’ he said.”). 
67 See Meredith L. Weiss, Diversity, Rights, and Rigidity in Singapore, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 625, 638 (2011) (“The government’s efforts to shift its stance toward gays and lesbians–the better to 
lure the creative class—ultimately sparked rights claims in two directions: first, from or on behalf of LGBT 
Singaporeans, and second, from Christians (and to a less vocal extent, Muslims) demanding the state 
maintain standards of morality and ‘family values.’”); see also Meredith L. Weiss, Rejection as Freedom? 
HIV/AIDS Organizations and Identity, 4 PERS. ON POLS. 671, 675 (2006) (“Singapore will find homophobic 
repression increasingly at odds with cultivating a hip, metropolitan image as well as inconvenient for public 
health purposes. Regardless, the still-powerful government is reluctant to loosen an anxiously 
heteronormative order over much (not least for practical reasons like fear of declining birthrates) and most 
Singaporeans remain chary of nudging ill-defined ‘OB’(out-of-bounds) markers.”). 
68 See MOBILIZING GAY SINGAPORE, supra note 27, at 118–19. 
69 Id. 
70 A recent official survey confirmed the long-held understanding that the majority of Singaporeans 
did not approve of homosexuality.  See Chun Han Wong, Is Some Talk Too Gay For Singapore?, WALL ST. 
J. (Feb. 6 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/searealtime/2014/02/06/sexuality-faqs-spark-gay-debate-in-
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positively change public opinion.  Since the culturally conservative majority 
was cited as the reason for retaining the law,71 advocates adopted an 
incrementalist approach of increasing positive visibility of the gay 
population in hope of securing greater acceptance from the majority 
population.72 The gay community embraced nationalism and modeled their 
movement after characteristically Singaporean cultural tenets of non-
confrontation, social stability, and abiding by the laws.73  
The public relations campaign culminated in the creation of an annual 
event called Pink Dot.74  The event represents gay activism within the rules 
of the illiberal state.  In 2000, the Singaporean government designated an 
area in a public space, Hong Lim Park, as exempt from typical licensing 
requirements for public speeches and assembly.  Individuals desiring to 
utilize the space in Hong Lim Park under the exemption needed only to 
register in advance with the police and agree to limit their speech to avoid 
“caus[ing] feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between different 
racial or religious groups in Singapore.”75  In 2008, the government renewed 
and extended this exemption to include performances and exhibitions.  This 
allowed the gay community to organize its first Pink Dot gathering as a 
sanctioned event in May 2009.76  The event drew around 2,500 participants, 
and helped promote the image of Singaporean gays as law-abiding and 
community-oriented.77 
                                                                                                                                                                 
singapore/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (“A survey completed in April of 2013 by Singapore’s Institute of 
Policy Studies showed that 78% of 4,131 respondents (mostly citizens) felt that sexual relations between 
two adults of the same sex is ‘always wrong/almost always wrong,’ compared to only 11% who felt that it 
is ‘not wrong most of the time/not wrong at all.’”). 
71 Tan, supra note 30, at 78 (“[I]t is the government that hails Singaporeans as a conservative 
majority forming the bedrock of national identity, which is presented nearly always as unstable and 
threatened by the ineluctable forces of globalization.  By constructing the conservative majority as an 
unquestionable—even valuable—given, the government claims its moral authority to continue exercising 
power in a paternalistic, perfectionist, and thoroughly persuasive manner, all performed in their name.”). 
72 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 59, at 148 (“A process that is incremental and persuades people or their 
representatives of the acceptability or even desirability of minority rights is much more likely to stick. The 
incremental process will take a lot longer, but it will be more lasting.”); see also William N. Eskridge Jr., 
Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation Has Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93 
B.U. L. REV. 275 (2013). 
73 See Chua, supra note 43, at 726–28. 
74 See id. at 737–38. 
75 MOBILIZING GAY SINGAPORE, supra note 27, at 80. 
76 Sharanjit Leyl, Singapore Gays in First Public Rally, BBC (May 17, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8054402.stm (last visited Nov. 15, 2015) (Pink Dot became possible 
“after Singapore loosened law on public gatherings last year. Currently any gathering can be held that does 
not touch on topics of race or religion.”). 
77 See id. (“According to Jack Soh, [one of the organizers of Pink Dot,] there was no overt political 
message being sent to the government.  It was not a protest or a political rally. The event was for 
Singaporeans in general—to affirm our respect for diversity and the freedom to love, regardless of sexual 
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C. The Constitutional Challenges to Section 377A 
Not long after the first Pink Dot, an incident emerged that provided 
the possibility of a constitutional challenge of Section 377A in the courts, 
but eventually created potential internal tensions for the gay movement in 
Singapore.  In March 2010, Tan Eng Hong was arrested for having oral sex 
with another man in a public restroom stall in a shopping mall and charged 
under Section 377A.  Tan hired activist attorney M. Ravi to challenge the 
constitutionality of Section 377A.78  The gay community reacted with mixed 
feelings.  Some looked forward to finally challenging a patently offensive 
law that Parliament had tacitly assured would not be enforced.79  Yet others 
reacted with more apprehension given the circumstances of Tan’s arrest.80  
For example, upon news of Tan’s constitutional challenge, People Like Us, 
one of the pioneering gay advocacy groups in Singapore,81 issued this 
statement:  
 
People Like Us do[es] not condone sex in public spaces where 
conflict with other members of society can occur.  At no time 
do we say that these should not be prosecutable offences. We 
have however long held the view that should the State wish to 
prosecute, it should do so using gender-neutral laws, so that 
whether the specifics are same-sex or opposite-sex, there is 
parity in treatment.82 
 
With this statement, People Like Us attempted to distance gay identity from 
the moral implications of the Tan Eng Hong incident.  By doing so, 
however, People Like Us was also legitimizing the rule of law so long as 
                                                                                                                                                                 
orientation.  ‘We recognise that many Singaporeans are conservative . . . so we planned an inclusive event 
that would reach all Singaporeans, straight and gay,’ Mr. Soh says.”). 
78 Rajah & Thiruvengadam, supra note 53, at 668. 
79 See MOBILIZING GAY SINGAPORE, supra note 27, at 135. 
80 See George Baylon Radics, Decolonizing Singapore’s Sex Laws: Tracing Section 377A of 
Singapore’s Penal Code, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 93 (2013) (“The local gay community, popular 
bloggers, and leaders all criticized Ivan [Tan Eng Hong’s English name] and his lawyer for pushing 
forward, and the other man who was caught in the toilet stall with Ivan dropped the case. Ivan continued, 
despite the criticism and pressure he faced from his friends, family and community and never claimed that 
he was pursuing the case for anyone but himself. He harbors some resentment over the way the system 
treated him and believes that things can improve.”). 
81 See Russell Heng, Tiptoe Out of the Closet: The Before and After of the Increasingly Visible Gay 
Community in Singapore, 40 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 81 (2001). 
82 On the Prosecution of Mr. Tan Eng Hong Under Section 377A and the Challenge to the Law’s 
Constitutionality, PEOPLE LIKE US (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.plu.sg/society/?p=169 (last visited Nov. 15, 
2014). 
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there was equal application of the law.83  For some Singaporean gay activists 
who had been endeavoring to challenge the stereotypes of gays as sexual 
deviants with campaigns like Pink Dot, Tan Eng Hong represented the bad 
queer image they were seeking to avoid.84 
Tan Eng Hong’s constitutional challenge occurred over two stages: 
first as a matter of standing, and later on the substantive merits.  In October 
2010, the Attorney General dropped the Section 377A charge against Tan, 
charged him instead under the public obscenity statute, and moved to 
dismiss the constitutional challenge to Section 377A due to lack of 
standing.85  The trial court granted the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss, 
and the Singaporean High Court affirmed the trial court decision on appeal.86  
However, in August 2012, the Singaporean Court of Appeal overturned the 
decision, ruling that Tan had standing to sue based on the “real and credible 
threat of prosecution under an allegedly unconstitutional law.”87  The Court 
of Appeal remanded the case to the High Court to decide the merits of the 
equal protection and liberty challenges,88 and set forth a two-prong test to 
determine the equal protection issue.89   
Tan Eng Hong’s challenge paved the way for incrementalist activists 
to mount their own challenge.90 As a result of the ruling on standing, the 
Singaporean gay community was able to mobilize and offer another case to 
challenge Section 377A, even without an arrest or prosecution.  Gary Lim 
Meng Suang and Kenneth Chee, a committed gay couple who had been 
together for over 15 years, filed their case in November 2012.91  They 
primarily argued that Section 377A was a violation of equal protection.  
Compared to Tan Eng Hong’s more unseemly criminal case, Lim and 
Chee’s constitutional challenge represented a more media-friendly test case 
                                                      
83 Id. (saying that “People Like Us do not condone sex in public spaces” but calling for “gender-
neutral laws” and “parity in treatment”). 
84 Radics, supra note 80, at 97. 
85 Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at paras. 6–7. 
86 Id. at para. 8. 
87 Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney General (Tan Eng Hong I) [2012] S.G.C.A. 45, at para. 115. 
88 The Court of Appeal, however, dismissed the Article 14 Freedom of Association challenge.  See id. 
at para. 130 (“Section 377A does not violate any of the three limbs of Art 14(1).  Even if any Art 14(1) 
rights are engaged by [Section] 377A, these rights are expressly stated to be subject to the need to preserve 
(inter alia) public order (see Art 14(2)(a)–14(2)(c)).  In so far as [Section] 377A criminalises ‘gross 
indecency’ between males in public, the public order rationale applies.  The same rationale applies to 
preserve the constitutionality of [Section] 294(a), which criminalises ‘any obscene act in any public place.’ 
In so far as [Section] 377A also criminalises ‘gross indecency’ between male homosexuals in private but 
does not criminalise the same between female homosexuals, this is more properly dealt with under Art 12 
rather than under Art 14.”). 
89 Id. at para. 185. 
90 Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 10. 
91 Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73. 
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that better fit the careful and deliberate strategy of pragmatic resistance 
employed by the gay community in Singapore.  Despite the ostracization of 
Tan Eng Hong by incrementalists, Lim and Chee’s challenge would not have 
been possible without Tan’s lawsuit on the issue of standing. 
The emergence of two separate cases with two distinct strategies 
reveals the rift in Singaporean gay advocacy across the good gay and bad 
queer dichotomy.  Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee employed a strategy that 
scaled back on the legal arguments made by Tan Eng Hong.92  Tan based his 
challenge against Section 377A on both equal protection and individual 
liberty interests.93  Tan’s case included libertarian principles that contest 
state repression of gay conduct as infringements on individual liberty.94  Lim 
and Chee, however, mounted their case purely on equal protection grounds 
and adopted a more accomodationist strategy of portraying gay couples as 
similar to and wanting the same treatment as other law-abiding heterosexual 
citizens.95  The two cases also revealed a segregated hierarchy within the gay 
community in Singapore in terms of shaping public perception of gays in the 
illiberal state.  Whereas Tan’s challenge experienced very little support and 
at times opposition from the community, Lim and Chee’s case was met with 
overwhelming public support and media attention.96 
Tan’s marginalization was likely caused by multiple intersecting 
issues that reflect the challenges of gay advocacy within Singapore’s 
illiberal democracy.  First, he was appealing a criminal case, which not only 
perpetuated the image of the bad queer but also offended the rule of law 
sensibilities of the general populace who are structurally conditioned to not 
                                                      
92 Tan Eng Hong’s challenge contained both an Article 9 liberty and an Article 12 equal protection 
arguments, while Lim and Chee’s challenge contained focused on the Article 12 equal protection argument.  
See Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 19-20; Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para.19.  It should be 
noted, however, that the personal liberty interest was less directly at stake in the Lim and Chee case 
because there was no actual arrest made and thus no outstanding habeas corpus issue.  See id. at para. 7.  
93 See Tan Eng Hong II, S.G.C.A. 45, at para. 6 (arguing that 377A not only violated Article 12(1), 
but also Articles 9 and 14 of the Singapore Constitution, which provide for liberty and freedom of 
association).  See also Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1965) Art 12(1) (“All persons are equal 
before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.”); id. at Art 9(1) (“No person shall be 
deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law.”); id. at Art 14(1) (providing that “(a) 
every citizen of Singapore has the right to freedom of speech and expression; (b) all citizens of Singapore 
have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms; and (c) all citizens of Singapore have the right to 
form associations.”). 
94 See Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 21. 
95 See Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 1 (arguing that 377A violated of Article 12(1) of the 
Singapore Constitution, which provides for equal protection).   
96 Radics, supra note 80, at 95 (“At a recent book launch, Ravi described Tan’s case as even more 
difficult than challenging the death penalty because of a lack of public support.  In contrast, Singapore 
responded to Lim and Chee’s case with overwhelming support.  Lim and Chee have successfully solicited 
online donations for their legal costs and have received technical support to create a seven-minute video 
that outlines their case.”). 
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question the legitimacy of the rules.97  His challenge was more libertarian in 
nature—which, by definition, is critical of government interference—and 
thus represented more drastic and radical activism that did not resonate with 
the majority of Singaporeans.98  Up to that point, gay activists had adopted 
the cultural norm of working within the system.99  In contrast, Tan Eng 
Hong’s attorney, M. Ravi, was prominently known as an activist with a 
record of confronting the government on controversial issues.100  There may 
have been concern that the association of gay rights with such a figure risked 
drawing the attention of an illiberal government known for quickly quashing 
voices of dissent.101  In this regard, Tan Eng Hong’s case may have been 
seen as counteracting the deliberately slow and careful strategy of pragmatic 
resistance that Professor Lynette Chua describes as “seek[ing] to advance 
the movement while ensuring that it survives the scrutiny and potential 
retaliation of authoritarian rulers.”102 
Hoping that his case would not be overshadowed and subsumed by 
the more sympathetic challenge brought by Lim and Chee, Tan attempted to 
have the two cases treated together.103  The High Court, however, did not 
comply.  The High Court’s decision in Lim Meng Suang  v. Attorney 
General came first. In April 2013, Judge Quentin Loh issued a decision 
upholding Section 377A as not violating equal protection.104  In August 
2013, still awaiting a decision, Tan Eng Hong applied with the Court to join 
                                                      
97 See Mutalib, supra note 24, at 313, 325 (describing a system of illiberal governmental control in 
Singapore that includes “regulation of all key institutions of the state apparatus such as the bureaucracy, 
grass roots organisations, trade unions and mass media, and co-opting leaders to oversee these institutions”; 
“periodic changes to the Constitution which radically transform the Republic’s electoral and parliamentary 
systems, such as the introduction of the NCMPS, NMPS, EP and GRCS”; “punitive actions against 
opposition and public dissent in general which has resulted in the perceived ‘climate of fear’ that haunts the 
citizenry and the concomitant ‘subject’ political culture in Singapore”). 
98 Id. at 325–26 (“The Republic’s traditional immigrant and clan mentality, which continues to 
influence the psyche of the majority Chinese populace (whose emphasis on financial and material pursuits 
is universally known), and the lack of a developed competitive political tradition given the Republic's short 
period of nationhood, has created a generation of Singaporeans who do not know, let alone are capable of 
fathoming, some other style of governance than the PAP.”). 
99 COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 150 (“From the movement’s 
timorous beginnings to its coming out, activists continued to interact with formal law and the political norm 
of legal legitimacy as important factors that shape their tactics.”). 
100 Rajah & Thiruvengadam, supra note 53, at 661–69. 
101 See Mutalib, supra note 24, at 325. 
102 See MOBILIZING GAY SINGAPORE, supra note 27. 
103 See Radics, supra note 80, at 90 (“Initially, there was some concern that his case would be 
dismissed given the pending constitutional challenge by Lim and Chee . . . [G]iven the similarity of the two 
challenges, Tan respectfully asked the High Court to issue both opinions at the same time.”). 
104 See Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73.  
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the Lim and Chee appeal as an interested party.105  Lim and Chee objected to 
Tan joining their case, which further emphasized their divide, both 
philosophically and personally.  Tan eventually acquiesced to Lim and Chee 
and dropped his motion to join when the Court assured him that his case 
would be decided.106 Tan Eng Hong awaited the decision in his case over the 
summer.  That summer, gay activists’ attentions were split simultaneously 
between mustering an appeal to Judge Loh’s decision in Lim Meng Suang 
and organizing the fifth annual Pink Dot event, which had been steadily 
growing and garnering support over the years.  Since many of the organizers 
of Pink Dot were the same activists garnering support for the Lim and Chee 
appeal, it is no surprise that the two actions converged into a concerted 
effort.  To increase public visibility of the constitutional challenge, the Pink 
Dot organizers set Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee as their flag bearers for the 
event in 2013.107  
In contrast, the Pink Dot organizers purposefully distanced their event 
from Tan Eng Hong, even though the High Court decision on his 
constitutional challenge was imminent.108  His exclusion from Pink Dot 
created a small controversy within the local gay community, with some 
critics condemning the discrimination that was occurring within the gay 
community itself.109  Critics argued that the gay community was diverse and 
reflected a multiplicity of identities across the good gay and bad queer 
spectrum.110  For them, the face of gay Singapore was being misrepresented 
for the sake of mainstream acceptance.111  Gay individuals who were more 
like Tan Eng Hong than Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee experienced further 
marginalization—even their own community treated them as invisible.  This 
further perpetuated the growing governmental and public stance that some 
forms of gay expression were unacceptable.  Pink Dot and its incrementalist 
brand of gay sensibility, in contrast, steadily saw increasing acceptability 
among Singaporeans, growing to a 21,000 attendance in 2013, and 26,000 in 
                                                      
105 Andrea Ong, Man in Gay-Sex Law Challenge Applies to Join Separate Appeal, STRAITS TIMES 
(Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.straitstimes.com/breaking-news/singapore/story/man-gay-sex-law-challenge-
applies-join-separate-appeal-20130814 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
106 See Selena Lum, Gay-Sex Law Case: Man Drops Bid to Intervene, STRAITS TIMES (Sept. 8, 2013), 
http://news.asiaone.com/news/singapore/gay-sex-law-case-man-drops-bid-intervene (last visited Nov. 15, 
2014). 
107 See Radics, supra note 80, at 96. 
108 See id. at 96–97.  
109 See id. at 97. 
110 See, e.g., Nicholas Leow, Why I would liked to have worn pink but couldn’t, Online Citizen (July 3, 
2013), http://www.s3raph.com/2013/07/03/why-i-would-like-to-have-worn-pink-but-couldnt/ (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2014) 
111 See, e.g, id. 
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2014.112  This represents a tenfold increase in just five years since inception.  
Pink Dot has not only gained growing community support over the years, 
but it has also attracted sponsorship from multinational corporations as 
well.113    
Judge Loh finally ruled on the Tan Eng Hong case in October 2013 
with a decision, unsurprisingly, to uphold the constitutionality of Section 
377A.  After the ruling, Tan Eng Hong applied again to have his case 
consolidated with the Lim and Chee appeal.114  Days later, despite the 
objections of the Attorney General and the attorney for Lim and Chee, 
Deborah Barker, the Court of Appeal ruled that it would consolidate the 
appeals and treat them together.115  After consolidation, Lim and Chee’s 
attorney framed the Article 9 liberty issue as one of privacy, which 
“include[s] a right of personal autonomy allowing a person to enjoy and 
express affection and love towards another human being.” 116   By 
characterizing the liberty interest as one of privacy and intimacy, she 
differentiated her clients as good gays in comparison to Tan Eng Hong as the 
bad queer. 
The Court of Appeal’s decision to consolidate the cases created a 
situation where Singapore became positioned to accomplish what Lawrence 
did not: acknowledge that good gays and bad queers are cut of the same 
cloth and should not be segregated differently in society. The Court of 
Appeal issued its decision on the consolidated case in October 2014, and 
upheld Section 377A.117  The Court initially recognized that Lim and Chee 
were making a different liberty argument than Tan Eng Hong,118 yet in the 
                                                      
112  Dominique Mosbergen, Refusing to Be Silenced, Thousands Come Out for Singapore’s ‘Pink Dot’ 
LGBT Rights Rally, HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/28/ 
singapore-pink-dot_n_5539810.html. 
113 See Wong, supra note 66 (“[M]ore multinational companies are stepping up to publicly support 
Singapore’s annual gay rights event, Pink Dot, happening on 28 June [2014]. Gay sex is banned in 
Singapore, but companies including Google, Barclays, J P Morgan, Goldman Sachs and BP are on board as 
corporate supporters for what has become the city-state’s biggest annual gathering organised by civil 
society.”). 
114 See Terry Xu, S377A—Tan Eng Hong Will Have His Day in Court, ONLINE CITIZEN (Oct. 10, 
2013), http://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2013/10/s377a-tan-eng-hong-will-have-his-day-in-court/. 
115 Amanda Lee, Appeals Against S377A Ruling to Be Heard Together, STRAITS TIMES (Oct. 10, 
2013), http://www.straitstimes.com/breaking-news/singapore/story/appeals-two-section-377a-challenges-
will-be-heard-together-20131010?page=2#sthash.QXH1W3rF.dpuf; see also Lum, supra note 19. 
116 Lim Meng Suang and Kenneth Chee Mun-Leon v. Attorney General (Lim Meng Suang II) [2014] 
S.G.C.A. 53, at para. 29. 
117 See Lim Meng Suang II, S.G.C.A. 53. 
118 Id. at para. 43 (“The arguments raised by Mr. Ravi and by Ms. Barker on Art 9 in the present 
appeals are different.  Ms Barker argues that the right to life and personal liberty under Art 9(1) should 
include a limited right to privacy and personal autonomy allowing a person to enjoy and express affection 
and love towards another human being.  Mr. Ravi, on the other hand, contends that [Section] 377A is vague, 
arbitrary and absurd.”). 
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end combined them into one and the same.119  The Court rejected the liberty 
argument on both fronts, and maintained that the true question “brings us 
back (in substance at least) to the issue of whether or not s 377A ought to 
enforce broader societal morality.”120 
More importantly, the Court of Appeal rejected Lim and Chee’s 
attempt to characterize the original purpose of Section 377A as punishing 
bad queers, specifically male prostitutes, and therefore inapplicable to a 
private consensual relationship such as their own.  Deborah Barker, counsel 
for Lim and Chee, argued that the primary purpose of Section 377A was “to 
combat the problem of male prostitution…[and] applying [Section] 377A to 
categories outside the narrow category just mentioned (viz., male 
prostitution) would be over-inclusive and, hence, unconstitutional.”121 The 
Court of Appeal, however, refused to accept the distinction.  It ruled that the 
original intent of Section 377A “covered all situations relating to ‘acts of 
gross indecency’ between males, [and] it would follow that similar situations 
involving male prostitutes would also be covered on an a fortiori basis.”122  
The Court of Appeal ultimately ruled that this underlying public morality 
purpose of Section 377A was an issue that could only be overturned by the 
legislature.123  By collapsing the range of gay sexuality, both legitimized and 
delegitimized, into one case, the Court of Appeal called upon the legislature 
and Singaporean society to consider homosexuality across the spectrum, not 
just when it looks heterosexual. 
III. GAY SKIN, ASIAN MASKS: SEGREGATING PRIVATE IDENTITY FROM 
 PUBLIC VISIBILITY AND TWO FACES FOR GAY RIGHTS IN SINGAPORE 
A. Lim Meng Suang and the Pitfalls of Equal Protection in the Illiberal 
State 
The competing strategies in both challenges to Section 377A illustrate 
the tensions between sexual identity and national identity within Singapore’s 
hybridized form of democracy, where rights seem incomplete when 
compared to the more expansive rights of citizens in full democracies.  Like 
the Texas statute that was overturned in Lawrence v. Texas, Section 377A 
                                                      
119 Id. at para. 53 (“Mr, Ravi’s argument [on the absurdity of Section 377A] here closely resembles 
Ms. Barker’s argument that ‘personal liberty’ in Art 9(1) should be interpreted to include a limited right to 
privacy and personal autonomy.  For the results given above, Mr. Ravi’s argument in this particular guise 
must likewise be rejected.”). 
120 Id. at para. 49. 
121 Id. at para. 131.  
122 Id. at para. 148.  
123 Id. at para. 79. 
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prohibits sodomy only between homosexuals and not heterosexuals. 124  
Thus, as in Lawrence, there was a compelling argument for the government 
to strike down the statute on equal protection grounds.125  Lim and Chee’s 
case specifically raised the point that Section 377A prohibits homosexual 
men from engaging in behavior that is lawful between heterosexual couples 
and lesbian couples.126  Lim and Chee referenced Lawrence, among other 
foreign precedents, as a model for striking down the law.127  However, equal 
protection in Singapore evolved somewhat differently than in Western 
democracies.  As Professor Kevin Tan explains, in Singapore “the law 
recognizes the need for a state to discriminate between its subjects.  In itself, 
discrimination is neither morally objectionable nor unlawful.”128  Rather, 
“the key to legal discrimination is the concept of classification . . . the idea 
of ‘equal before the law’ and ‘equal protection under the law’ was that of 
equal justice.”129  
To determine whether Section 377A violated equal protection, the 
Singapore Court of Appeal set forth an “intelligible differentia” test for the 
High Court to apply on remand, where “a differentiating measure prescribed 
by legislation would be consistent with Art 12(1) only if: (a) the 
classification was founded on an intelligible differentia; and (b) the 
differentia bore a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the 
law in question.”130  The test prescribed by the Court of Appeal indicates 
rational review, an older standard of equal protection that preceded the strict 
scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny standards developed in the United 
States,131 but different from the form of rational review ambiguously utilized 
in Lawrence.132  The traditional form of rational review, which is also 
                                                      
124 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) s 337(A) (“Any male person who, in public or private, 
commits, or abets the commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male 
person of, any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a 
term which may extend to 2 years.”); see also Douglas Sanders, 377 and the Unnatural Afterlife of British 
Colonialism in Asia, 4 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 16–17 (2009). 
125 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
126 Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 24. 
127 See Chang, supra note 63, at 328. 
128 KEVIN TAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN SINGAPORE 156 (2011). 
129 Id. 
130 Tan Eng Hong I, S.G.C.A. 45, at para. 124. 
131 See, e.g., Jack Lee Tsen-Ta, Equal Protection and Sexual Orientation, 16 SING. L. REV. 228, 231 
(1995) (“Rational review may be termed the ‘traditional’ standard of review.  It was the earliest to be 
applied and is evident in all four jurisdictions [the United States, India, Malaysia and Singapore].  It is 
apparently the sole standard of review in India.  On the other hand, American courts have gone on to 
develop heightened standards of review in the form of strict scrutiny, and more recently, intermediate 
review.”). 
132 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Tribe, supra note 7, at 
1916. 
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employed in other postcolonial Commonwealth countries such as India and 
Malaysia, prohibits legislation against a class but allows for reasonable 
classification between persons.133   
 In applying the first prong of the rational review test in Lim Meng 
Suang, Judge Loh agreed with the Attorney General’s interpretation and 
found intelligible differentia for Section 377A based on gender.134   Judge 
Loh ruled that the intelligible differentia of Section 377A covered acts of 
gross indecency between males but not gross indecency between males and 
females or between females.135  Judge Loh stated that “Parliament, in 
dealing with the issues arising within and without the country, is entitled to 
pass laws that deal with, inter alia, the myriad of problems that arise from 
the inherent inequality and differences pervading society.”136  Judge Loh’s 
ruling is consistent with Professor Tan’s description of Singaporean 
tolerance of discrimination between subjects where “legislative 
discrimination or selective application of the law [is] necessary to deal with 
‘the complex problems arising out of an infinite variety of human 
relations.’”137 
 Judge Loh’s reasoning also indicates the general deference to public 
order and social stability as overriding interests in illiberal pragmatic 
governance.138  In applying the second prong of the intelligible differentia 
test, Judge Loh ruled that the differentiation bore a rational relation to the 
object sought in the original 1938 legislation, identified as a direct response 
to the prevalence of gross indecent acts between males.139  In respect to the 
argument that gay men were being treated differently from women, Judge 
Loh noted that in 1938, there was little concern with female gross indecency, 
                                                      
133 See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 
341, 344 (1949) (“The Constitution does not require that things different in fact be treated in law as though 
they were the same.  But it does require, in its concern for equality, that those who are similarly situated be 
similarly treated.  The measure of the reasonableness of a classification is the degree of its success in 
treating similarly those similarly situated.”). 
134 See Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at paras. 28, 48. 
135 See id. at para. 48. 
136 Id. at para. 44. 
137 TAN, supra note 128, at 156 (quoting Public Prosecutor v. Su Liang Yu [1976] 2 MLJ 128 
(Malay.)). 
138 See Li-ann Thio, Lex Rex or Rex Lex? Competing Conceptions of the Rule of Law in Singapore, 20 
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 53 (2002) (“Singapore retains an array of laws allowing the curtailment of 
individual liberties without judicial redress so as to serve the imperative of the broadly defined idea of 
‘public order.’”). 
139 Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 67 (“The act of males engaging in grossly indecent acts 
with other males was to be criminalised. The prevalence of such acts was a regrettable state of affairs and 
was not desirable. It was necessary to strengthen the criminal law and enable it to prosecute males engaging 
in such grossly indecent acts even if the acts were committed in private. This was because the then 
prevailing law made it difficult to detect and prosecute such acts.”). 
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which is consistent with the then contemporaneous European tradition of 
viewing male homosexual behavior as being more aggressive and 
transgressive than female homosexual behavior.140  Again, the justification 
for the law centers on public order and social stability. 
Professor Yap Po Jen suggests that Judge Loh’s ruling overly fixated 
on the 1938 rationale for the law with little regard to the evolution of its 
intent over time.141  However, as this author has previously written, even 
though attitudes regarding homosexuality in the former colonial power had 
since liberalized, Singapore resisted similar international pressure to 
conform.  Instead, Singapore nationalistically vaunted its conservative Asian 
values as part of its postcolonial identity, even though the anti-gay position 
retained specters of the colonial past. 142   In this respect, Judge Loh 
specifically tied the conservativism of the present, as reflected in the 2007 
Parliamentary debates, to the same conservativism of the colonial past.143  In 
the end, Judge Loh ruled that the continued moral conservatism of the 
majority constituted a valid state interest satisfying the second prong of the 
rational review test. 144   Judge Loh’s justification relied largely on 
Parliament’s concern with maintaining a balance between adopting certain 
Westernized values for the sake of economic growth while not upsetting the 
status quo for a conservative, postcolonial population.145  In Tan Eng Hong, 
                                                      
140 See Robert G. Moeller, “The Homosexual Man Is a ‘Man,’ the Homosexual Woman Is a 
‘Woman’”: Sex, Society, and the Law in Postwar West Germany, 4 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 395 (1994).  
141 See Yap Po Jen, Section 377A and Equal Protection in Singapore: Back to 1938?, 25 SING. ACAD. 
L.J. 630 (2013). 
142 Chang, supra note 63, at 337. 
143 Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 85 (“It is clear from the speeches made during the October 
2007 Parliamentary Debates that the purpose of [Section] 377A has not changed from the purpose 
articulated by AG Howell in 1938. After extensive consultations at all levels, the Government decided to 
repeal [Section] 377 but retain [Section] 377A.  Because of the Petition presented to Parliament, which 
called for the repeal of [Section] 377A, the debate over the abolition or retention of this provision took 
place and in fact overshadowed the rest of the proposed amendments to the 1985 Penal Code.  The reason 
for [Section] 377A’s retention, which affirmed the purpose of the provision as articulated by AG Howell in 
1938, was that Singapore was a conservative society where the majority did not accept homosexuality.”); id. 
at para. 78 (“Should we look at the October 2007 Parliamentary Debates to ascertain the purpose or object 
of [Section] 377A?  I do not think there is a need to do so, but in any event, I found that those debates did 
not assist the Plaintiffs at all. In this case, the purpose of [Section] 377A was articulated, albeit within the 
context of a colonial government, when it was enacted by the Legislative Council in 1938.  Section 377A 
was considered again some 69 years later, and it was decided that the provision should be retained even 
though [Section] 377 was to be repealed.  That was the view taken by Parliament in 2007. In effect, the 
purpose of [Section] 377A as articulated by AG Howell in 1938, was reaffirmed by Parliament in 2007.  
That purpose therefore still remains valid today.”). 
144 Id. at para. 138.  
145 See Tan, supra note 30, at 23–44 (“Nation building, therefore, took the form of preserving private 
spheres where these eternal ‘Asian’ ethnicities could flourish and provide the deeper historical, cultural, 
and moral resources for a stable and substantial overarching Singaporean identity.  In the public sphere, 
there were to be secularism, equal opportunities for all, and common modes of communication and 
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Judge Loh largely dispensed with the Article 12 equal protection argument 
with a sweeping reference to his reasoning in Lim Meng Suang. 146  
Furthermore, in its October 2014 ruling that upheld the constitutionality of 
Section 377A, the Court of Appeal relied almost exclusively on colonial 
moral justifications from 1938 to satisfy the second prong of the intelligible 
differentia test.147 
By setting rational review as the standard, the Court of Appeal also 
created a limited structure for understanding equal protection for gays.  
Although lesbian sex is mentioned, the first prong of the intelligible 
differentia test is more centrally concerned with the question of comparing 
gays to heterosexuals. 148   Finding commonality between gays and 
heterosexuals is not only the chief question in Lim Meng Suang, but is also 
the driving question in the incrementalist approach to gay advocacy in 
Singapore, though it ultimately proves to be the wrong question.  Lim and 
Chee’s challenge asked the Court, and society generally, to determine 
whether gays are similarly situated as heterosexuals, and therefore should be 
treated the same.  Tan’s case asked the Court to additionally determine 
whether, even if gays are treated differently than heterosexuals, they should 
also be treated as criminals.  By including additional liberty arguments, the 
Tan challenge imagined that a solution to Section 377A must ultimately 
exist outside the rational review structure set by the Court of Appeal in the 
standing case.  To accomplish this, Tan combined his liberty claim with 
equal protection under a larger natural law umbrella, which Judge Loh 
hesitantly agreed to engage in upon appeal.149 Like Pink Dot, the Lim and 
Chee lawsuit employed a strategy that abides within the legal structure 
provided, whereas Tan Eng Hong challenged the validity of the structure 
itself. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
participation.  The public sphere would be the ‘common space’ that with time and collective confidence 
should increase as Singaporeans give priority to their national over their ethnic identities.”). 
146 Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at paras. 85–86. 
147 Lim Meng Suang II. S.G.C.A. 53, at paras. 117-152. 
148 Tan Eng Hong I, S.G.C.A. 45, at para. 126. 
149 Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 20 (“I am compelled to consider the Natural Justice Issue 
because Mr Ravi has framed this issue in such a way that it does not fall outside the litigation boundary 
delineated by the Court of Appeal in Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney General [2012] SGCA 45.  It will be 
recalled that the Court of Appeal found that if s 377A was void for violating the right to equality before the 
law and equal protection of the law under Art 12(1) and therefore unconstitutional, the Plaintiff’s rights 
under Art 9(1) would be engaged on the facts of this particular case since his arrest and detention under s 
377A had deprived him of his personal liberty.”). 
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B. Tan Eng Hong and the Liberty Critique of Authoritarian Rule of Law 
 
Tan Eng Hong’s challenge was fundamentally more confrontational 
than Lim and Chee’s case because it argued that Section 377A subverts the 
rule of law, 150  a foundational principle upon which the Singaporean 
government bases its authority.151  Tan’s attorney, M. Ravi, argued that in 
order to be legitimate, the rule of law must rely on more than simple formal 
validity and reflect larger overarching principles of natural justice.152  Equal 
application of the laws is not enough if the laws are invalid in the first place.  
Ravi’s argument suggests that equal protection is insufficient without 
confronting more foundational liberty principles, so that if Section 377A “is 
found to contravene the fundamental rules of natural justice and is, 
accordingly, not ‘law’, the Plaintiff’s arrest and detention under that section 
would have resulted in a deprivation of his personal liberty in a manner 
which was not justified by any law, and would have been 
unconstitutional.”153  
M. Ravi specifically expanded equal protection into a larger rule of 
law argument involving liberty.  He tied the prohibited conduct to 
fundamental identity, arguing that Section 377A was criminalizing a 
“natural and immutable attribute.”154  Normally, an immutable trait is used 
as a factor in determining indicia of a suspect class in applying American 
strict scrutiny review,155 a standard not followed by Singapore or even the 
United States in respect to gay rights.  Although Ravi did argue for a 
heightened standard of review,156 citing recommendations from Professor 
Jack Lee,157 this was not the main point behind his use of immutability.  He 
couched immutability not solely within an equal protection framework but 
instead within his broader argument that Section 377A violates the rule of 
law, which touches on both equal protection and fundamental liberty.158  
Judge Loh reduced Ravi’s point to a question of fact,159 and created a factual 
impasse by situating the problem within a battle of experts.160  However, 
                                                      
150  Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 21. 
151  See generally Thio, supra note 138, at 53. 
152  Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 22(a). 
153  Id. at para. 21. 
154  Id. at para. 41. 
155  Lee, supra note 131, at 236. 
156  Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 88. 
157  Lee, supra note 131, at 255. 
158  Tan Eng Hong I, SGHC 45, paras. 21, 22(d). 
159  Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 45 (“Thus, on the Plaintiff’s own case, in order for his 
argument here to succeed, he must demonstrate two facts, viz., homosexuality is inborn and unable to be 
changed.”). 
160  Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 63. 
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Ravi’s immutability argument points to the ways in which conduct 
constitutes expression of fundamental identity, and that illicit gay conduct is 
merely symptomatic of the prohibitions against expression of gay identity.   
Ravi’s citation of Professor Lee suggests how rational review is 
insufficient because gays comprise a discreet and insular minority in 
Singapore, largely as a result of the immutability of their identity.  Although 
Judge Loh rejected Ravi’s proposal for strict scrutiny, which incorporates 
Lee’s reasoning, Lee’s analysis also reveals the inherent difficulty of an 
incrementalist approach that led to the favorable ruling in Lawrence.  Lee 
starts by describing a hypothetical scenario: 
 
If the majority has greater social contact with a minority, this 
diminishes the hostility that often comes with unfamiliarity and 
curbs the majority's tendency to exaggerate its superiority. The 
more we get to know people who are different in some ways, 
the more we begin to realise the ways in which they are the 
same. This is the beginning of political co-operation.161 
 
Lee adds, however, that this scenario has been made virtually impossible for 
the gay community in Singapore.  He notes that “homosexuals are 
anonymous and diffuse[d] throughout the population. It is this anonymity 
that makes them a discrete and insular minority. Strong prejudice against 
gays compels most to remain hidden for fear of losing their reputation and 
livelihood.”162   
 The lack of social acceptability drives gays to anonymous spaces.  
Gay men develop alternative spaces because the laws foreclose the venues 
for them to identify and encounter one another.163  Tan Eng Hong was 
arrested precisely because the existing laws do not allow a forum for public 
expression of homosexual intimacy, and he was likely forced to seek more 
discreet settings for meeting potential partners. Because there are no public 
spaces to explore gay sexuality due to Section 377A and the resulting 
stigmas towards gay identity, gay men in Singapore must turn to semi-
private spaces such as bathroom stalls and bathhouses to encounter one 
another.  During the 2007 debate to repeal Section 377A, Parliament 
                                                      
161  Lee, supra note 131, at 243. 
162  Id. 
163  Yap, supra note 141, at 635 (“If the State is seeking to argue that the object to be achieved by s 
377A is to reduce HIV infection in Singapore by discouraging reckless male homosexual activity, one then 
has to examine whether the criminalisation of same- sex male intercourse would be effective in achieving 
this goal or such measures would only drive the infection underground, impede legal HIV prevention 
efforts, and in turn increase net HIV infection in the country.”). 
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Member Hri Kumar Nair also suggested that criminalization drives 
homosexuality into underground spaces of anonymity.164 
 
C.  Reevaluating Lawrence in Light of Lim Meng Suang and Tan Eng 
Hong 
 
A comparison of the Singapore cases allows a reevaluation of the 
rationale promoted by Lawrence, and the subsequent entrenchment of 
incrementalism that followed.  Tan Eng Hong illustrates the circular 
interconnectedness between criminalization of homosexuality, public 
discrimination against gays, illicit homosexual behavior, and justifications 
for the criminal sanctions against gays.  This interrelationship was 
significant in the decision in Lawrence to overturn the Texas anti-sodomy 
statute.165  As Justice Kennedy explained, “When homosexual conduct is 
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an 
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public 
and in the private spheres.”166  Lawrence hinged, however, on the fact that 
Justice Kennedy found that the morality of the majority was not a valid 
interest that allows for differential treatment.167   
 The decision could easily have come out the other way, as it did in 
Singapore.  The opposite ruling in the Singaporean cases challenging 
Section 377A reveals the tenuousness nature of the Lawrence outcome under 
its semi-rational review approach, or any standard short of strict scrutiny.  If 
criminalization drives public disapprobation of gay expression, and the 
morality of the majority is a compelling state interest that justifies the 
prohibition of gay expression, then there will always be a rational reason for 
retention of Section 377A.  Thus, there is a need to look beyond equal 
protection, and consider protections of gay expression as an issue of 
liberty.168  In this respect, the arguments raised in Tan Eng Hong provide a 
                                                      
164  Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 October 2007) vol 83 at col 2242 (Hri 
Kumar Nair, Member of Parliament) (“making something illegal only forces it underground.  That will 
restrict the ability of the Government to respond to the HIV threat through promotion and education, when 
Government agencies feel that they cannot engage with the gay community in any way except a 
condemnatory one.”). 
165  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). 
166  Id. 
167  Id. at 577 (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history 
nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.” (quoting Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
168  Lee, supra note 131, at 256 (“heightened scrutiny reinforces the notion of fundamental liberties. If 
some rights are established as fundamental by the Constitution, it stands to reason that everyone is entitled 
to these rights before claims to non-fundamental rights can be granted.”). 
28  WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  VOL. 24 NO. 1 
 
useful lens to consider the gaps left in Lawrence, and the impetus to treat 
homosexuality as a matter of privacy weighed against societal morality.  
 Though equal protection is included in his larger natural law argument 
in Tan Eng Hong, Ravi tailored a more specific rule of law challenge that 
appeals to liberty, citing the landmark Singaporean habeas corpus case Chng 
Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs.169  Ravi cited Chng to argue that 
Section 377A is an arbitrary law violating fundamental rule of law 
principles.170  In Chng, the appellants Chng Suan Tze, Kevin Desmond de 
Souza, Teo Soh Lung, and Wong Souk Yee were among sixteen individuals 
accused of conspiring against the government and detained without trial 
under the Internal Security Act (ISA) in 1987.171  The ISA conferred on the 
President and Prime Minister discretionary power to detain individuals in 
order to preserve public order and security.172  The government invoked the 
ISA to detain the appellants for being part of a “Marxist conspiracy.”173   
The appellants denied such involvement, alleging that the law was illegally 
applied to prevent them from exercising their civil and political liberties.  
The Chng case specifically challenged the discretionary power of the state to 
suspend the liberty interests of individuals, as such discretion rises to the 
level of arbitrariness.174  Although the appellants were unsuccessful at the 
lower court levels, the Court of Appeal agreed with the appellants.175  In 
Chng, the Court or Appeal asserted: “[T]he notion of a subjective or 
unfettered discretion is contrary to the rule of law.  All power has legal 
limits and the rule of law demands that the courts should be able to review 
the exercise of discretionary power.”176  In response to Chng, the Singapore 
Parliament quickly mobilized to amend the Constitution and the ISA to 
prohibit judicial review of detentions based on internal security.177   
 At its heart, the Chng case differentiated “rule of law” from “rule by 
law,” with the former putting into question the legitimacy of the latter as an 
                                                      
169  See Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs and others and other appeals, [1988] S.G.C.A. 
16. 
170  Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 65. 
171  Chng Suan Tze, S.G.C.A. 16, at paras. 2–3. 
172  Id. at paras. 43–46. 
173  Id. at para. 2. 
174  Id. at paras. 30, 78–82. 
175  Id. at para. 140. 
176  Id. at para. 156. 
177  Internal Security Act (Cap 143, 1985 Rev Ed), amended by Internal Security Amendment Act (Act 
2 of 1989) (adding sections 8A, 8B, 8C, and 8D); see also Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1965), 
Art 149(3); see also Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs and others and other appeals [1988] SLR 
16 (upholding the amendments implemented following the decision in Chng); see also Josiah Zee, 
Defending Singapore’s Internal Security Act: Balancing the Need for National Security with the Rule of 
Law, MURDOCH U. L. REV., June 2011, at 35. 
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acceptable exercise by the illiberal state.178  Perhaps in order to expedite his 
own legal conclusion, Judge Loh bundled Ravi’s application of Chng as a 
simple example in his larger natural justice argument.  Judge Loh refused to 
recognize the distinct criticism of rule by law that Ravi tried to make: “I find 
it difficult to see how Mr. Ravi’s reliance on the concept of the rule of law as 
applied in Chng Suan Tze takes his case further than a singular reliance on 
the fundamental rules of natural justice.”179  Judge Loh misread Ravi’s 
application of Chng as a simple call for judicial review180 when Ravi was 
more likely drawing a larger criticism of the rule by law system that Section 
377A represents.  Ravi possibly invoked Chng to reveal the inherent 
contradictions of Section 377A as a product of illiberal pragmatism.  The 
2007 compromise to keep Section 377A as the official law but not 
proactively enforce it was intended by the Prime Minister and Parliament to 
maintain public order.  However, that compromise instead creates disorder 
by allowing Section 377A to be discretionarily applied in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner.  In other words, Section 377A demonstrates how the 
illiberal state justifies disorder in the name of order.181   Unsystematic 
enforcement creates a seemingly arbitrary system that contradicts the rule of 
law, and instead exposes it as rule by law in its rawest form. 
 
D.  Public Visibility and the Semiotics of Queerness 
 
Ravi argued that Section 377A is fraught with so much ambiguity and 
discretion in application that it is unconstitutionally vague because it 
“violates the fundamental principles of natural justice and the rule of law 
which demand, among others, certainty and predictability.” 182   Ravi 
                                                      
178  Raja, supra note 37, at 211 (“The Court’s words hold the promise of a collaborative legal complex 
mobilization, of judges uniting with lawyers to assert the ‘rule of law’ in the face of ‘rule by law’ state 
practices).  See also Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, Shall the Twain Never Meet? Competing Narratives and Discourses 
of the Rule of Law in Singapore, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 298, 305 (2012). 
179  Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 66.  
180  Id. at para. 67 (“Ostensibly, ‘rule of law’ in that context meant that the court retained the final 
power to re-examine the exercise of the Executive’s discretion. The Executive was therefore subject to the 
rule of law. Unlike the respondents in Chng Suan Tze, it is not the Defendant’s case in the present 
proceedings that s 377A is not reviewable by the court. I am therefore unable to see how bringing in the 
concept of rule of law as used by the court in Chng Suan Tze adds anything.”); Judge Loh had also confined 
his reference to Chng in the Lim Meng Suang case to an analysis of judicial review.  See Lim Meng Suang I, 
SGHC 73, at para. 112. 
181  Jothie Rajah, Punishing Bodies, Securing the Nation: How Rule of Law Can Legitimate the 
Urbane Authoritarian State, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 945, 948-49 (“Just as the state has appropriated and 
emasculated Westminster institutions and ideologies as “an adjunct to, rather than as a constraint against” 
state authoritarianism [], so too has Singapore selectively performed emasculated facets of the rule of law, 
facets that lack the core capacity to limit state power.”). 
182  Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 80. 
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illustrated that under Section 377A, even “kissing, holding hands, or even 
merely hugging,”183 could constitute an arrestable violation.  Judge Loh 
dismissed this argument by reasoning:  
 
It should be evident from the considerations which were extant 
in 1938 (when the earliest predecessor of  377A was enacted) 
that there is at least an arguable case that the conduct in the 
hypothetical example given by Mr. Ravi would not constitute 
an offence under [Section] 377A. In fact, it is quite telling that 
none of the more than a hundred case authorities cited by Mr. 
Ravi was of a decision by the Singapore court convicting two 
males for kissing, holding hands or hugging.184   
 
Judge Loh’s decision seems to indicate that there is some level of 
predictability to the law.  However, Judge Loh’s finding is inconsistent with 
the original analysis of the Court of Appeal in the earlier Tan Eng Hong 
standing case and its extension to Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee.   
In the same way that Tan Eng Hong was granted standing to sue even 
though there was no longer a prosecution pending under Section 377A, Gary 
Lim and Kenneth Chee were also deemed to have standing to conduct their 
own constitutional challenge based on the realistic possibility that they could 
be prosecuted under Section 377A.  Under the unofficial compromise of 
non-enforcement, Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee likely would not have been 
arrested under Section 377A.  Their conduct was completely private and 
consensual; exactly the type of relationship against which Parliament agreed 
not to proactively enforce Section 377A.  In fact, Gary Lim and Kenneth 
Chee conveyed to the Court that “the real pressure which they experience on 
account of their relationship seems to have been from their respective 
parents, their respective families and members of society, and not from any 
officer of the law.”185 
Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee would not typically be arrested or 
prosecuted under the law because their conduct was not necessarily public.  
However, the Court of Appeal intimated that Section 377A had broad 
implications beyond the type of behavior contained in Tan Eng Hong’s 
situation: 
 
                                                      
183  Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 82. 
184  Id. at para. 83. 
185  Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 10. 
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[W]ithout going into the merits of the Application, we want to 
acknowledge that in so far as [Section] 377A in its current form 
extends to private consensual sexual conduct between adult 
males, this provision affects the lives of a not insignificant 
portion of our community in a very real and intimate way. Such 
persons might plausibly assert that the continued existence of 
[Section] 377A in our statute books causes them to be 
unapprehended felons in the privacy of their homes.186   
 
Lim and Chee’s sexual conduct would not have ever been discovered 
but for their admission that such conduct was taking place in private.  The 
Court of Appeal’s finding, however, suggests that there need not even be an 
admission.  Even though their sexual conduct was not in public view, the 
nature of their relationship created a deduction that such conduct was taking 
place privately.  In other words, their relationship itself communicates the 
fact that illicit conduct is occurring.   
Tan Eng Hong’s attorney intimated this point in his argument.  Ravi’s 
example of kissing and holding hands further subverts the distinction 
between seen and unseen, public and private.  Ravi’s desexualized 
illustration of kissing and holding hands indicates that even though those 
types of conduct do not facially constitute violations of Section 377A, they 
nevertheless signal private violations that could be prosecuted.  Thus, Ravi’s 
use of kissing and holding hands as a hypothetical suggests that Section 
377A does not so much punish conduct, but really punishes identity.  
 Tan Eng Hong, Gary Lim, and Kenneth Chee were all subject to 
discretionary prosecution under Section 377A not necessarily because their 
conduct was in fact witnessed, but because their identities as gay men 
marked them as presumptive violators of the law.  In this respect, Ravi 
indirectly raised the issue whether treating gays differently even within their 
own community is productive if the law, and society, will treat unobtrusive 
sex in private as equivalent to deviant sex in public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
186  Tan Eng Hong I, S.G.C.A. 45, at para. 184. 
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IV. FALSE CLOSETS AND THE REPRESSIVE POLITICS OF GOOD GAYS AND 
BAD QUEERS 
 
A. Proscribing False Closets Through Equal Protection and Privacy 
 
The Singaporean government’s unofficial non-enforcement of Section 
377A as to private consensual conduct sets a hard divide between what is 
impermissible to be seen in public versus what is allowed to persist so long 
as it remain invisible.  Judge Loh’s reasoning in Lim Meng Suang on the 
issue of non-enforcement largely depended on the conclusion that Section 
377A does not differentiate between public and private, seen and unseen.  
The issue of non-enforcement was a major argument lodged by Lim and 
Chee when challenging the rational relation of Section 377A to any 
legitimate government purpose:187 if the law is not to be enforced, then there 
is no reason for the law to exist.  Judge Loh, however, argued that actual 
enforcement is irrelevant to the primary purpose of Section 377A, which he 
concluded was intended to serve as “a moral signpost . . . that reflect[s] the 
views of a vast majority of society who were not ready to accept 
homosexuality as part of our mainstream way of life.”188  To this end, non-
enforcement does not frustrate the purpose of Section 377A if the purpose is 
to function as the symbolic disapproval of homosexuality in Singaporean 
society.189  Thus, for Judge Loh, it did not matter whether Lim and Chee 
would actually have been arrested, or even detected, as the original purpose 
of Section 377A was to prevent homosexual behavior even if it was private 
and consensual.   
In fact, Judge Loh found that one of the primary purposes for adopting 
an anti-sodomy statute in 1938 was specifically to extend the law to 
encompass not only public but also private conduct.  He asserted: “It was 
necessary to strengthen the criminal law and enable it to prosecute males 
engaging in such grossly indecent acts even if the acts were committed in 
private. This was because the then prevailing law made it difficult to detect 
and prosecute such acts.” 190  Judge Loh’s finding contains tacit 
acknowledgment that prosecution of public acts drives homosexual behavior 
                                                      
187  Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 101. 
188  Id. at para. 84. 
189  Id. at para. 134 (“Whether s 377A can still fulfill its purpose of signaling the public’s 
disapprobation of male homosexual conduct notwithstanding the policy of non-enforcement is a 
consideration for Parliament and is also supported by the presumption of constitutionality. The Plaintiffs 
have only provided mere postulations, but no material evidence, to show that the purpose of s 377A would 
not be achieved if the provision is not actively enforced.”). 
190  Id. at para. 67. 
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underground, 191  into private and closeted spaces, so that it is less 
detectable.192  
Professor Eve Sedgwick defines such closeting as both a product and 
a manifestation of state oppression, where state endorsement of public 
discrimination against gays further confines them into unseen, private 
areas.193  At one level, the unofficial nonenforcement of Section 377A 
means that individuals like Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee, who conduct their 
identities in the confines of private domestic spaces, are allowed to practice 
their gay identities, while individuals like Tan Eng Hong are not.  In this 
light, the agreement to not prosecute private actions under Section 377A 
could be understood as a condemnation of only public obscenity.  Professor 
Michael Hor argues how, if prosecution of publicly indecent acts is the 
purpose, then Section 377A is superfluous since there are other criminal 
laws that exist to prosecute those types of behavior.194  The whole reason 
why Tan Eng Hong’s challenge initially required a decision on standing was 
because the prosecution had dropped the Section 377A charge in favor of a 
public obscenity charge.195  However, the decisions of the Court of Appeal 
and Judge Loh, which seem to disregard the public and private distinction, 
suggest that Section 377A concerns more than just keeping homosexual acts 
outside of public sight and consciousness.     
Professor Joan Howarth argues that anti-sodomy statutes, even when 
unenforced, create “false closets” for many gay individuals, forcing upon 
them the choice to publicly identify as citizens or criminals in respect to 
their sexual identity.196  Howarth’s analysis suggests that the quest for 
legitimacy, when pursued in certain ways, becomes a closet that inevitably 
proves illusory and false.  The equal protection argument provides a veneer 
of legitimacy to allow certain gay individuals, such as Gary Lim and 
Kenneth Chee who claim similarity to conforming heterosexuals, to hide 
among those heterosexuals.  Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee would not be 
prosecuted under Section 377A, not just because they are hidden away from 
                                                      
191  See Yap, supra note 141, at 635. 
192  Jean Shin, The Asian American Closet, 11 ASIAN L.J. 1, 1 (2004) (“The gay closet…is a term used 
to describe the process by which some gays may hide their sexuality from public view, in order to avoid 
social disapproval or legal sanctions.”). 
193  See EVE SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 71 (1990). 
194  Michael Hor, Enforcement of 377A: Entering the Twilight Zone, in QUEER SINGAPORE: ILLIBERAL 
CITIZENSHIP AND MEDIATED CULTURES 45, 57 (Audrey Yue and Jun Zubillaga-Pow eds., 2012). 
195  Tan Eng Hong I, S.G.C.A. 45, at para. 1. 
196  Joan W. Howarth, Adventures in Heteronormativity: The Straight Line from Liberace to Lawrence, 
5 NEV. L.J. 260, 268 (2004) (“Lawrence thus stands as a monument to the power of even unenforced law. 
By repudiating Bowers, Lawrence…vindicated Liberace’s choice to use the law to construct a false closet. 
Liberace insisted on being part of the American mainstream. When made to choose, he chose being a 
citizen, not a criminal.”). 
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public view, but because they invisibly conform even in full public view.  
Professor Kenji Yoshino characterizes this as the difference between 
“passing” and “covering.”197  As advertised by the gay advocacy movement 
in Singapore, Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee are a gay couple that is like any 
other law-abiding couple in Singapore and therefore deserve equal rights.  
Under this view, they deserve equal rights not so much because of their gay 
identities, but because of their identity as a normative couple. 
Thus, at another level, the nonenforcement of Section 377A against 
people like Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee can be understood as a method of 
disciplinary state control through self-policing within the gay community.  
Nonenforcement constitutes a compromise between the state and certain gay 
individuals who agree to conform as citizen subjects and recognize the 
legitimacy of the rule of law when applied against nonconforming subjects 
such as Tan Eng Hong.  The alienation of Tan Eng Hong by gay activists 
such as People Like Us and Pink Dot segregates gays who are like 
heterosexuals, and therefore deserve protections, from gays who are not, and 
therefore do not deserve protections.  The “covering” that occurs through the 
compromise camouflages gay identity within the veneer of social and moral 
acceptability.  In his address to Parliament during the debate to repeal 
Section 377A, Prime Minister Lee Hsieng Loong alluded generally to spaces 
where homosexuality exists and will continue to be tolerated with full public 
knowledge.198  Yet obtaining tolerance through this method is, as Howarth 
describes, false, since working within the rules legitimizes only the rules, not 
the subjects.199 
During the 2007 parliamentary debates, petitioners from the Repeal 
377A movement described the gay community as model citizens, “often 
responsible, invaluable, and highly respected contributing members of 
society.”200  Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong responded by acknowledging 
their good citizenship, but nevertheless bifurcated their interests from the 
family-oriented goals of the mainstream population, calling for compromise 
                                                      
197  Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002) (passing, in which the gay individual is 
expected to hide her minority sexuality and to impersonate a heterosexual; and covering, in which the 
“underlying identity is neither altered nor hidden, but is downplayed.”). 
198  Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 October 2007) vol 83 at col 2400–01 (Lee 
Hsieng Loong, Prime Minister and Minister for Finance) (“De facto, gays have a lot of space in Singapore.   
Gay groups hold public discussions.  They publish websites.  I have visited some of them.  There are films 
and plays on gay themes . . . There are gay bars and clubs.  They exist.  We know where they are.  
Everybody knows where they are.  They do not have to go underground.  We do not harass gays.  The 
Government does not act as moral policemen.  And we do not proactively enforce section 377A on them”). 
199  Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 
245 (2006). 
200  Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 October 2007) vol 83 at col 2399 (Lee 
Hsieng Loong, Prime Minister and Minister for Finance). 
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between the two poles for the sake social stability and harmony.201  Gary 
Lim and Kenneth Chee represent a deeper retreat into the domestic arena for 
the purposes of legitimization.  Parliament justified the retention of Section 
377A by citing the values of Singapore as a family-oriented society set 
against deviant gay subjects like Tan Eng Hong.202  Gary Lim and Kenneth 
Chee serve as a foil to Tan Eng Hong—they are presented not as deviating 
from family values, but rather as exemplifying family values.   
The disavowal of Tan Eng Hong and the veneration of Gary Lim and 
Kenneth Chee have been central to the incrementalist strategy of gay 
advocacy in Singapore.  With the polarization of Gary Lim and Kenneth 
Chee against Tan Eng Hong as representative models of gay identity, 
Singapore is at the same crossroads for gay rights as post-Stonewall politics 
of gay liberation in the United States.  Originally, the gay rights movement 
was much more radical in its response to the criminalization of gay 
identity,203 and treated domesticity and marriage with more ambivalence.204  
However, as Professor Yuvraj Joshi has observed, “[s]ince the late 1970s, 
there has been a paradigm shift within queer politics in which equality 
                                                      
201  Id. at cols. 2399–2400 (Lee Hsieng Loong, Prime Minister and Minister for Finance) (“So, we 
should strive to maintain a balance, to uphold a stable society with traditional, heterosexual family values, 
but with space for homosexuals to live their lives and contribute to the society.”). 
202  Id.at col. 2242 (Li-Ann Thio, Nominated Member of Parliament) (“Acts of gross indecency" under 
377A also covers unhygienic practices like "rimming" where the mouth comes into contact with the anus. 
Consent to harmful acts is no defence, otherwise, our strong anti-drug laws must fall as it cannot co-exist 
with letting in recreational drugs as a matter of personal lifestyle choice.  Opposite-sex sodomy is harmful, 
but medical studies indicate that same-sex sodomy carries a higher price tag for society because of higher 
promiscuity and frequency levels. The New York Times reported that even informed homosexuals return to 
unsafe practices like bare-backing and bug-chasing after a health crisis wanes. A British Study showed that 
the legalisation of homosexual sodomy correlated with an upsurge of STDs among gays…Public sexual 
morality must buttress strong families based on faithful union between man and wife, the best model for 
raising children. The state should not promote promiscuity nor condone sexual exploitation.”). 
203  Michael Warner, Normal and Normaller: Beyond Gay Marriage, 5 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 
119, 123 (1999) (For example: “[i]t resisted any attempt to make the norms of straight culture the standards 
by which queer life should be measured”; “[i]t especially resisted the notion that the state should be 
allowed to grant legitimacy to some kinds of consensual sex but not others or to confer respectability on 
some people’s sexuality but not others’”; “[i]t insisted that much of what was taken for morality, 
respectability, or decorum was, in practice, a way of regulating sexual relations and pleasures”; “[i]t taught 
that self-esteem must not be purchased with a disavowal of sex; it must include esteem for one’s sexual 
relations and pleasures, no matter how despised they may commonly be”; “[i]t made itself alert to the 
invidiousness of any institution, like marriage, that is designed both to reward those inside it and to 
discipline those outside it: adulterers, prostitutes, divorcees, the promiscuous, single people, unwed parents, 
those below the age of consent-in short, all who are, for the purposes of marriage law, queer”; “[i]t insisted 
that any vision of sexual justice begin by considering the unrecognized dignity of these outcasts, the ways 
of living they represent, and the hierarchies of abjection that make them secondary, invisible, or deviant”; 
“[i]t became alert to the danger that the same hierarchies would continue to structure the thought of the gay 
and lesbian movement itself, whether through ‘internalized homophobia,’ in-group hostility, or simply the 
heteronormative perspective unconsciously embedded in so much of our thought and perception.”). 
204  See Douglas Nejaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and 
its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CAL. L. REV. 87, 94–98 (2014). 
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politics have eclipsed liberation politics. Legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships has become heralded as the final frontier of queer politics.”205  
Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee represent a similar shift in Singaporean gay 
activism away from radical politics of individual liberty to a politics of 
respectability for the committed couple.206   
In the United States, the transformation of gay identity into an issue of 
respectability arguably begins with Lawrence v. Texas, the case which Lim 
and Chee emulated and referenced with the hope of obtaining similar results.  
Several scholars note how in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy domesticated the 
defendants John Lawrence and Tyron Garner by framing their sex within an 
imagined context of a committed, consensual relationship.207  However, 
there was never any factual corroboration whether Tyron Garner was in a 
committed relationship with John Lawrence208 (similar to Gary Lim and 
Kenneth Chee) or whether the two were simply engaged in an otherwise 
anonymous rendezvous, (similar to Tan Eng Hong and his nameless “co-
accused” partner).209  By adopting one interpretation of the facts over the 
other, the Lawrence decision painted a scenario where homosexuality is a 
publicly acceptable domestic practice, to the tacit exclusion of other forms 
of sexual expression that continue to be unimaginable and unspeakable.210  
As Joshi explains, “respectable queerness—suggests  that the newfound 
public recognition of gay people and relationships is contingent upon their 
acquiring a respectable social identity that is actually constituted by public 
performances of respectability and by privately queer practices.”211  Justice 
Kennedy did not pronounce sodomy as absolutely permissible, but rather 
                                                      
205  Yuvraj Joshi, Respectable Queerness, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 415, 416 (2012); see also 
Libby Adler, The Gay Agenda, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 148 (2009). 
206  See generally JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A 
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1983); see also Martin Meeker, Behind the Mask of 
Respectability: Reconsidering the Mattachine Society and Male Homophile Practice, 1950s and 1960s, 10 
J. HIST. SEXUALITY 78 (2001). 
207  Franke, supra note 6, at 1408 (“Just as the Court’s earlier Bowers decision and the military’s 
‘don’t ask, don't tell’ policy overdetermined gay men and lesbians in sexual terms, we now celebrate a 
victory that at its heart underdetermines, if not writes out entirely, their sexuality.  Previously, when courts 
considered the legal status of gay men, they approached the specter of homosexual sex with a horror 
ordinarily reserved for incest cases.  Now gay men are portrayed as domesticated creatures, settling down 
into marital-like relationships in which they can both cultivate and nurture desires for exclusivity, fidelity, 
and longevity in place of other more explicitly erotic desires.”); Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the 
New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 387, 398 (2012); Noa Ben Asher, Conferring 
Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 37 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 243, 255 (2014). 
208  Murray, supra note 207, at 398. 
209  Tan Eng Hong I, S.G.C.A. 45, at para. 4. 
210  See Yoshino, supra note 197, at 815 (describing the historical connotations of “sodomy [as] the 
‘sin which should neither be named nor committed,’ or the ‘detestable, and abominable sin, amongst 
Christians not to be named.’”). 
211  Joshi, supra note 205, at 416. 
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delineated where and when sodomy was permissible.  In the same way, the 
competing challenge by Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee immediately following 
the ruling in the Tan Eng Hong standing case served as a method of 
eclipsing and silencing Tan in favor of a more respectable version of 
homosexuality.  As a couple who only wanted to legally pursue their “more 
enduring bond” with one another, their challenge against Section 377A was 
implied to be seeking a more venerated goal than the less deserving Tan, the 
single man who presumably desired only anonymous sex.  
Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee, as a committed monogamous couple, 
look as though they are married, and their equal protection argument 
depended largely on this similarity.  Tan, on the other hand, could not claim 
such a comparison.  To this effect, Judge Loh acknowledged the potential 
applicability of Hollingsworth v. Perry in Lim Meng Suang,212 but not in Tan 
Eng Hong.  Marriage is often cast as the archetypical model for legitimate 
consensual sex and intimacy.213  In the United States, Lawrence paves the 
path to legitimizing gay marriage, 214  or perhaps seen another way, 
legitimizing gays through marriage.215  Hollingsworth and Windsor, read in 
this light, represent the further entrenching of marriage as the ideal 
expression of legitimate sexuality.216  The Windsor decision was, at a certain 
level, a validation of the choice of Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer to 
conform to the normative standard of marriage—they chose to legitimatize 
their relationship, and thus should be allowed the right to enjoy the same 
benefits as others who made similar choices.217  In this respect, the Lawrence 
decision has indeed become, as Justice Scalia partly anticipated,218 the 
forbearer to a normative strategy for legitimizing gay marriage. 
                                                      
212  Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 141. 
213  See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 961 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding of fact no. 34, 
“Marriage is the state recognition and approval of a couple’s choice to live with each other, to remain 
committed to one another and to form a household based on their own feelings about one another and to 
join in an economic partnership and support one another and any dependents.”). 
214  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 601 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This reasoning leaves on 
pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.”). 
215  Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1398 (2005) (“[the] moral 
heuristic of marriage spawns a novel set of social meanings for lesbian and gay identities.  Merely locating 
these identities squarely at the center of the moral matrix it configures, which predicates granting lesbians 
and gay men full standing within the moral community, gives us, in identity terms, lesbians and gay men as 
moral citizen, heterosexuals’ equals.”). 
216  See Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 709 
(2002); see also Carlos A. Ball, This is Not Your Father’s Autonomy: Lesbian and Gay Rights From a 
Feminist and Relational Perspective, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 345 (2005). 
217  Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1391 (2005) (“[U]nmarried 
couples can properly be treated differently than married couples on a theory of presumed consent--you’re 
choosing not to get marriage benefits if you don’t marry.”). 
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state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples”); Windsor v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) 
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B. The Biopolitics of Respectable Domesticity 
 
The question remains whether gay marriage is indeed the end of gay 
rights.219  However, in the same way that we currently debate whether our 
society has become post-racial,220 we will soon likely enter an era where we 
will ask if we have also become post-sexuality.  In this respect, gay marriage 
is perhaps a mirage of formal equality that can mask surviving and invidious 
inequalities.221  From a cynical perspective, Hollingsworth and Windsor may 
have simply granted invisibility to remaining homophobic prejudices in 
society by segregating the gay community into good gays and bad queers.222  
Ironically, Windsor could potentially be used to validate discrimination 
against “bad queers.”  There is an argument that those who do not choose the 
same path of formal equality through marriage as Edith Windsor and Thea 
Spyer, freely choose to reject that equality and therefore freely choose to be 
                                                                                                                                                                 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When the Court declared a constitutional right to homosexual sodomy, we were 
assured that the case had nothing, nothing at all to do with ‘whether the government must give formal 
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legalized, ninety percent of the political work necessary to achieve gay and lesbian equality would have 
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leader in the wake of Prop. 8, recently declared that the ‘entire gay rights agenda’ entails the right to marry, 
bans on discrimination in employment and education, and immigration rights for transnational same-sex 
couples.  He went on to say that once these laws are in place, ‘the fight over gay rights [will be] essentially 
over.””) (quoting ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL 173, 178 (1995)); see also Andrew Sullivan, 
The End of Gay Culture: Assimilation and Its Meaning, NEW REPUBLIC, 16 (2005) (identifying assimilation 
as the “end of gay culture”); see also DANIEL HARRIS, THE RISE AND FALL OF GAY CULTURE (1997). 
220  Sumi Cho, Post-racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1594 (2009) (defining post-racialism as the 
“belief that due to the significant racial progress that has been made, the state need not engage in race-
based decision-making or adopt race-based remedies, and that civil society should eschew race as a central 
organizing principle of social action.”). 
221  See Robinson, supra note 219, at 1066 (“To assume that same-sex couples will follow the 
trajectory of different-sex couples seems curious and shortsighted.  Advocates for LGBT people should 
think more critically about the enduring effects of homophobia as well as the structural obstacles that same-
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222  Erez Aloni, Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting Legal Recognition of 
Same-Sex Marriage, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 105, 158 (2010) (“[L]egalization of same-sex 
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JANUARY 2015  GAY LIBERATION IN THE ILLIBERAL STATE  39 
 
discriminated against.  In this respect, marriage becomes at once both a 
sanctuary and a prison for gays to enjoy apparent equality in society.  The 
path to that prison starts with Lawrence.  Justice Kennedy went to great 
lengths to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate sex 223  and 
effectively constrained John Lawrence and Tyron Garner within an imagined 
normative structure of a committed relationship even though there was no 
evidence of such.224  He placed Lawrence and Garner in a false closet, where 
their contrived domesticity defined their non-criminality. Justice Kennedy’s 
idealized vision of committed gay relationships has become a standard by 
which the gay community polices itself. The marriage equality movement is 
a push toward normalizing gay sex so that it is like heterosexual sex.225   
Those who subscribe to the ideal of marriage enjoy protections, whereas 
those who do not are left out. 
In his lectures on the evolution of disciplinary power in the modern 
state, Michel Foucault defines “biopower,” or the “right to make live and let 
die,”226 as a method of modern population control in the liberal democracy.  
Having evolved beyond old exercises of power such as war and the physical 
killing of aberrant elements of the population,227 the modern state exercises 
biopower to affect population dynamics through the granting and denying of 
civil rights.228  The state allows certain demographics to thrive through 
recognition of their rights, while consigning others to political death through 
nonrecognition.229  The right to live, or rather the right to live under certain 
                                                      
223  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors.  It does not involve 
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reneges.  The constitutional protection afforded in the space between marriage and crime is available to 
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Bodies, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 617 (2010). 
228  FOUCAULT, supra note 226, at 240. 
229  Id. at 255. 
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conditions as defined by the state, can only be enjoyed by those who claim 
those rights and conditions.  As Professor Eduardo Mendieta summarizes, 
biopower is the “insidious rationality of having to submit life to the 
management of the state, [where] the granting of rights presupposes having 
been allowed to live, or to be recognized as living by the political order.”230  
In the modern liberal democracy, populations are controlled no longer 
through physical force, but through consent and consensus. Professor 
Christian Leval describes how Foucault’s theory operates in the liberal 
democracy, where “[p]ublic opinion is set up as a permanent tribunal, which 
is expected to provide the cheapest and most efficient regulation . . . [and] 
[g]overnmentality is the deliberate and careful way in which this chain is set 
to work in order to form, guide, correct, and modify behavior.”231  What 
results is a self-policing population that is disciplined into building 
consensus through conformity and exclusion.232 
The incrementalist march towards marriage equality narrows rights, 
which Foucault’s designates as “life,” to a discreet group of subjects who 
concede to conventional norms of acceptable sexuality.  A recent report by 
Harvard Law Review on developments in the law on sexual orientation and 
gender identity suggests that “[s]ame-sex marriage, it may be said, helps one 
particular constituency—middle-aged and middle-class gays and lesbians in 
committed partnerships—but it does little to resolve problems that are most 
significant to other constituencies under the LGBT umbrella.”233  Gay rights, 
when conceived of as climaxing in the equal right to marriage, excludes 
those who may not subscribe to marriage and desire to express their 
sexuality outside of normative monogamous relationships.234  Those who do 
not conform to marriage, once granted as an equal right, are consigned to 
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non-recognition,235 which creates political death.  For example, following 
Windsor, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services began to 
grant spousal and fiancée immigration rights to qualifying same-sex 
partners.236  However, in order to qualify, the couples are required to marry.  
Those who elect not to marry cannot take advantage of those rights.  The 
granting of equal rights for committed gay relationships started with the 
imagined domestication of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner and culminated 
with the conferring of marriage equality to Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer.  
Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee claim this American model as their inherited 
legacy.  This communicates to individuals like Tan Eng Hong, who may not 
be able to access such spaces due to socioeconomic or other differences,237 
that there is no place for their versions of homosexuality.238 
Ironically, the “out and proud” sensibility in the early days of gay 
rights in the United States was largely a response to the tyranny of the closet 
and the exiling of gay expression to more secretive and invisible venues 
caused by restrictive laws.239  Many activists regard the Stonewall riots240 as 
the turning point for a more public gay rights movement,241 which was 
founded as a radical protest against rule of law.242  Several scholars have 
criticized how the revolutionary beginnings of gay liberation have given way 
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to accommodationist strategies243 and submission to the rule of law.244  As 
Professor Katherine Franke critiques, a major pitfall of seeking equal 
citizenship is acknowledging the self as a citizen-subject.245  In contrast to 
Professor Kenji Yoshino, who identifies covering as a type of camouflage 
where “underlying identity is neither altered nor hidden, but is 
downplayed,”246 Franke suggests that rather than downplay, gay politics up-
plays a certain type of visibility and public performance that invites 
spectatorship.  Franke describes “a certain kind of citizen-subject who 
becomes politically legible by and through a particular form of intimate 
affiliation.”247 “Of course, the citizen-subjects who have signed up for this 
form of enfranchisement are called upon to enact a peculiar set of public 
performances.”248  Yoshino focuses on passing and covering as reactions to 
being judged by others249 in an effort to not be seen.  Franke, on the other 
hand, suggests that modern gay subjects engage in performances so that they 
are seen “not as abject criminals, but as citizen-subjects.”250  Yet the desire 
to be seen as respectable validates the norms for respectability.251 
The development of the self-policing subject depends on the 
interrelation between public spectacle and civic participation, of seeing the 
self as a citizen and thus an extension of the state when it stands in judgment 
of deviant elements.252  Yoshino briefly notes the juridical nature of passing, 
where “[t]o pass” can mean “to judge.”253  The performance of respectable 
gayness involves both judging and being judged, both seeing and being seen 
as participating citizens of the democratic state.  It is through these 
normalizing judgments, the consciousness of watching and being watched, 
that society determines who are equal citizens and who are not—this forms 
the basis of liberal government.254  Foucault develops his theory of biopower 
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largely in response to the failed revolutionary movements of the 1960s that 
eventually led to the rise of liberal democracy, and his criticism suggests that 
liberal government is a veiled form of totalitarianism.255  The shift in gay 
rights towards a strategy of incrementalism and assimilation aligns gay 
interests with the interests of the state,256 and demonstrates governmentality.   
 Ironically, although Lawrence seemed to declare that the morality of 
the majority was not a valid state interest,257 and Lim and Chee similarly 
challenged public morals as the reasonable rationale for Section 377A,258 the 
domesticated versions of gay existence that they presented actually 
legitimize the morality of the majority in other ways. Family values are 
routinely cited as reasons justifying the differential treatment of gays. The 
push for marriage equality embraces rather than challenges the validity of 
granting special privileges to families.  Lawrence, Windsor, Hollingsworth, 
and Lim and Chee’s case all envision and constrain gay sexuality within the 
structure of normative family values.  In the same way that Pink Dot does 
not challenge the restriction the Singaporean government places on public 
assembly and expression through speech, but instead acquiesces to the 
narrow restrictions imposed by the state, mainstream gay advocates in both 
Singapore and the United States have limited gay expression to the state’s 
definition.  The monogamous family unit becomes the narrow space for 
acceptable public expression of gay sexuality, just like a small corner in 
Hong Lim Park where gays are allowed to congregate publicly once per year.  
In the same way that Tan Eng Hong was hidden from view in the 2013 Pink 
Dot, the rights of “bad queers” like him been effaced and forgotten in the 
discourse of marriage equality. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Professor Jothie Rajah describes illiberalism “as the Other of 
liberalism . . . understood in terms of the absences, fractures and subversions 
of political liberalism.”259  Indeed, the apparent freedoms enjoyed by citizens 
in liberal democracies have often been used to criticize more restrictive 
conditions in many developing nations, particularly “Orientalized” countries 
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in Asia and the Middle East.260  Yet the comparison of recent gay rights 
cases in the United States and Singapore suggests that the liberalism and 
illiberalism may be equivalent if not also linked.261  At first blush, it may 
appear that the Singaporean gay rights movement, represented by Pink Dot 
and the Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee lawsuit, follows a Westernized strategy 
that has been successful in the United States and Europe.262  However, the 
strategy adopted in Singapore may not be a pure emulation of liberalism but 
a response to illiberalism.  As discussed earlier, illiberal pragmatism 
manifests in the unsystematic enforcement of Section 377A, which creates a 
culture of fear and caution for gay activism in Singapore.  Sensitivity to the 
totalitarian style of government has led to a strategy of incrementalism and 
accomodation to the rule of law, where gays cautiously set their own 
boundaries as to the proper time, place, and manner for gay life such as Pink 
Dot.  Rather than think of Singaporean gay activism as modeling a Western 
style of advocacy, it may be useful to consider the possibility that the gay 
rights movement in Singapore, though similar, evolved independently from 
gay movements in Western countries.  The fact that both systems of 
government bred gay movements that resulted in incrementalist approaches 
suggests that the two systems are not so different.  Thus, a comparative 
analysis of the gay movements in Singapore and the United States exposes 
the illiberal aspects of American democracy.  Under both systems, legal 
sexual expression is limited to heteronormative ideals of “more enduring” 
bonds of monogamy and marriage.  The legacy of Lawrence and marriage 
equality, in this light, is simply the American version of Pink Dot.   Gays are 
allowed freedoms of sexual expression insofar as they follow the rules.  
Moreover, by validating marriage as an institution, the push for marriage 
equality also maintains and shields continuing hierarchies and inequalities 
inherent in the institutions.263  
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Rather, there is some usefulness to recognizing differences among 
gays, and that marriage and monogamy are not solutions for all.  Judge 
Loh’s application of the intelligible differentia test to finally validate Section 
377A in Lim Meng Suang illustrates some fundamental problems with 
seeking only structural equal treatment as heterosexuals.  Despite attempts to 
hide among heterosexuals, gays are still perceived as fundamentally 
different.  Judge Loh’s explanation of rational review in the Lim and Chee 
decision, that “equality before the law and equal protection of the law under 
Art 12(1) does not mean that all persons are to be treated equally, but that all 
persons in like situations are to be treated alike,”264 foreshadows his eventual 
conclusion that Singaporean society intentionally differentiates gays from 
heterosexuals.  Even if Section 377A had been ruled a violation of equal 
protection, structural equality does not address the underlying attitudes at 
play that are responsible for the laws in the first place.  Successful 
constitutional challenges to anti-sodomy statutes in other jurisdictions have 
often come hand in hand with attitudinal changes in society regarding 
homosexuality, which is the chief assumption behind incrementalism.  As 
both Judge Loh and Parliament have made clear, however, Singaporean 
society has not arrived at this point, and progress will likely be slow given 
the illiberal pragmatics of the government.  Although Pink Dot has been 
exponentially growing, public opinion on homosexuality in Singapore has 
remained overwhelmingly negative with 78% of the population believing 
that homosexual relations are “always wrong/almost always wrong,” and 
only 11% believing they are “not wrong most of the time/not wrong at 
all.”265  In spite of attempts by gay couples like Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee 
to differentiate themselves from the stereotypes of criminality and deviance 
that Tan Eng Hong represents, society still views them no differently.  The 
decision by the Singaporean Court of Appeal to consolidate the two cases 
reflects this sentiment, yet its decision also allows for something more 
radical to occur. 
The Singapore Court of Appeal ultimately upheld the anti-sodomy 
statute, but one thing has become clear: if gays continue to be formally 
discriminated against, they will be discriminated against together.  The 
Court of Appeal refused to entertain Lim and Chee’s attempt to characterize 
their relationship as outside the moral scope of objectionable behavior such 
as male prostitution.266  Their relationship, although private and consensual, 
is to be treated equally as those of male prostitutes and people like Tan Eng 
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Hong.  In other words, in the eyes of the Singapore government, good gays 
and bad queers are the same.  This forces solidarity upon the gay 
community, which can then potentially create an alternative path to 
empowerment, and mark a return to the roots of gay liberation that appears 
to have been sidetracked as a matter of legal strategy in the United States.  
The current state of gay advocacy in Singapore offers a visualization of the 
road not travelled in Lawrence and the potential to imagine gay identity 
itself rather than legitimate expressions of gay identity as a recognized right, 
as well as a warning of the pitfalls of Lawrence and Windsor.   
 The Singaporean gay community currently adopts an incrementalist 
strategy for advocacy that accommodates the illiberal democracy in which it 
exists.267  The community has sought to create spaces for expression of gay 
identity within the rules on multiple fronts, organizing Pink Dot according to 
the time, place, and manner permitted by the government.268  Its model test 
case argues for equal treatment of gays with heterosexuals, per Lawrence 
and Windsor.  Yet, these American gay rights cases ultimately establish 
normative standards for proper sexual expression that produce self-policing 
gay subjects who are similarly compliant as subjects in an illiberal state.  
Tan Eng Hong, on the other hand, presents the perhaps radical argument that 
the behavior of some gay couples should not be differentiated from those 
that are deviant and criminal, and should not be venerated as models more 
suitable for publicly presentation.  Acknowledging the intelligible differentia 
between gays and heterosexuals, but not the intelligible differentia between 
committed gay couples, like Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee, and single men 
looking for singular sexual encounters, raises the question whether any of 
that behavior should be criminal, which may form the basis of a better model 
for gay liberation. 
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